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## "No Arnold Could Ever Write a Novel"

A. Dwight Culler

"No ARNOLD could ever write a novel." The remark is quoted by Max Müller as having been frequently in the mouth of Matthew Arnold, and although Müller goes on to say how gloriously it has been disproved by the work of Mrs. Humphry Ward,<sup>1</sup> I am not sure whether we should consider *Robert Elsmere* as evidence for the prosecution or the defence. Nonetheless, of Matthew at any rate, I am sure we would all agree, "No Arnold could ever write a novel." The reason is that he was so thoroughly the type of what Keats calls the Egotistical Sublime that he was unable to project himself into character and situation. Indeed, I have always held that the strongest evidence for the historicity of Marguerite is the simple fact that Arnold was incapable of inventing her. Still, a certain type of novel, I think that Arnold could write, and that is a historical novel where all the characters were aspects of his own personality and where the issues were intellectual or cultural ones. In other words, I think he could write a novel like *Marius the Epicurean*, and I think that in the first series of *Essays in Criticism* he approximated that form. In any case, what I should like to do today is to examine this volume with reference to its imaginative structure, not, indeed, claiming that it is a novel, but claiming that it has certain elements of imaginative unity, in its characters, its situation, and the progressive unfolding of its theme, that give it the aspect of a novel of ideas like *Marius*.

We recall that most of the essays were originally lectures which Arnold delivered as Professor of Poetry at Oxford. All were then published in periodicals, and it was not until July 1864 that Arnold suggested to Macmillan the idea of collecting them into a volume. After listing several of the essays, he added, "I am not at all clear that the papers should be printed in the order in which I have put them down."<sup>2</sup> The order in which he had put them down was simply the chronological order of their composition and publication. But when the volume actually appeared, their order was very different. Ignoring "A Persian Passion Play," which was added many years later, the order was as follows: "The Preface," "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," "The Literary Influence of Academies," "Maurice de Guérin," "Eugenie de Guérin," "Heinrich Heine," "Pagan and Mediæval Religious Senti-

ment," "Joubert," "Spinoza" (later entitled "Spinoza and the Bible"), "Marcus Aurelius." The question is, what determined this order?

We may perhaps gain a clue from the order in which Arnold arranged his poems. In planning the volume of 1853 he wrote to Clough, "I thought of a division of the poems according to their character and subject, into Antiquity—Middle Age—and Temps Moderne. . . . What do you think?"<sup>3</sup> When the poems appeared, they were not actually divided into these groups, but they were arranged essentially according to this scheme. The volume opens with five poems from antiquity ("Sohrab and Rustum," "Mycerinus," "Cadmus and Harmonia," "Philomela," and "The Strayed Reveller"), continues with five medieval poems ("Thekla's Answer," "Tristram and Iseult," "The Church of Brou," "The Nekan," and "The Forsaken Mer-man"), and concludes with a group of short poems that might roughly be considered modern and that ends with the poem "The Future." Thus, the *Poems* (1853) was in fact arranged chronologically according to subject. To a lesser degree this was also true of the two earlier volumes. *The Strayed Reveller, and Other Poems* begins with five classical poems and then proceeds through a group of "modern" sonnets to poems that lead us, by interrelated theme, from poems of passion to poems of philosophic detachment. Similarly, *Empedocles on Etna* begins with a poem drawn from antiquity, the title poem, then plunges us into the love poem, including the medieval "Tristram and Iseult," and finally moves into a group of philosophic lyrics which again ends with "The Future." In *Empedocles on Etna*, however, Arnold encountered a problem. Is the title poem ancient or modern? In the Preface of 1853, in which he rejected the poem from his new collection, he insisted that he was not doing so because its subject was ancient. But then he went on to say that into the situation of Empedocles "there entered much that we are accustomed to consider as exclusively modern,"<sup>4</sup> and by the time he had finished with Empedocles it was apparent that he was actually rejecting him because he was modern. The solution to the puzzle is, of course, that historically Empedocles was ancient but in spirit he was modern, and the evolution that Arnold was really interested in was not the chronological one of when men lived and died but the symbolic

1. F. Max Müller, *Auld Lang Syne* (London, 1898), p. 112.

2. William Buckler, *Matthew Arnold's Books: Toward a Publishing Diary* (Geneva and Paris, 1958), p. 67.

3. *The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough*, ed. H. F. Lowry (London and New York, 1932), p. 141.

4. *The Poetical Works of Matthew Arnold*, eds. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry (London and New York, 1950), p. xvii.



one of the various phases of the human spirit. It is upon this evolution that his poems are based, and it is my suggestion that the *Essays in Criticism* are based upon it too.

In order to make this clear I need to repeat very briefly what I have said elsewhere about Arnold's imaginative world.<sup>5</sup> It is a world divided into three regions which we may call the Forest Glade, the Burning or Darkling Plain, and the Wide-Glimmering Sea. The first is an idyllic region in which youthful figures live joyously in harmony with nature; the second is a region of mature suffering and isolation; and the third is a region in which suffering subsides into Calm and then grows up into a new Joy, the joy of active service in the world. Connecting these three regions is the River of Life or Time, and the thought is that man, whether in his individual life or in human history, moves from childhood faith and joy, through a period of skepticism and the understanding, to a final synthesis that reconciles the two.

If this be so, then the function of the opening essay in Arnold's collection, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," is to establish the historical setting of Arnold's novel. For this essay presents the same conception of history as does the poetry, that of vital or organic periods alternating with mechanical or critical periods, and it declares that this is a critical period. In the famous opening sentence: "Of the literature of France and Germany, as of the intellect of Europe in general, the main effort, for now many years, has been a critical effort." In the past, in the England of Elizabeth and the Athens of Pericles, there were great creative efforts, and there will be creative periods again. But at the moment we are in an age when it is impossible to write great poetry, and therefore the function of criticism at the present time is to prepare the current of true and fresh ideas that will make poetry possible once more.

The hero of Arnold's novel, then, is simply the person who does this, the seeker after Truth, and he is presented in the Preface. "To try," says Arnold, "and approach truth on one side after another, not to strive or cry, or persist in pressing forward, on any one side, with violence and self-will—it is only thus, it seems to me, that mortals may hope to gain any vision of the mysterious Goddess, whom we shall never see except in outline, but only thus even in outline." The difficulty is that the hero finds himself among a people who do not wish to seek after truth in this way but who conceive that they already possess it. Arnold calls these people the Philistines, and indeed the setting of this novel is Philistia. This is evident not merely from the frequency with which Arnold refers to the Philistines and

the children of light but also from the way in which he refers to himself as a kind of Moses, leading the children of Israel out of the wilderness into the promised land. At the very end of the first chapter, referring to the true life of literature, he says, "There is the promised land, towards which criticism can only beckon. That promised land it will not be ours to enter, and we shall die in the wilderness: but to have desired to enter it, to have saluted it from afar, is already, perhaps, the best distinction among contemporaries. . . ."

I have said that Arnold could not create character, but it is remarkable what a variety of characters—all of them Philistines—he has created in the first three chapters of his novel. There is the aggrieved translator of Homer, Mr. Wright, who complains that he has been denied any reason for existing. There are the young lions of the *Daily Telegraph*, who roar in their self-importance. There are Bishop Colenso and his Pentateuch, Miss Cobbe and her British College of Health, and that "colossal machine for the manufacture of Philistines," the British Constitution. Finally, over against these there is the *persona* which Arnold has created for himself, that of a sly and vivacious inquirer, and the action of the novel begins when Arnold rebukes the *Saturday Review* for thinking that the British nation has found the last word of its philosophy and cries, "No, we are all seekers still!" With this cry he sets out upon his quest.

At the very outset he almost fell into a trap. For as he crossed over the channel into France (Philistia is England) he encountered an institution that had as its very function to distinguish the excellent from the common, the catholic from the merely provincial, and as he observed how it had operated in France to make impossible the shoddy journeyman-work of literature which was the plague of his own nation, he thought to give himself to it entire. But then, remembering his own youthful remark that "a Code-G.-Sand would make G. Sands impossible,"<sup>6</sup> he quickly withdrew and decided that the true need was not to settle down in this or that French academy but to create an academy within one, "happier far." In this way, escaping from his own peculiar brand of Philistinism, he reaffirmed his original role, to be a seeker still.

This initial episode, however, taught him his method. If he was to be a seeker of truth, approaching it now on this side and now on that, he must never settle down with any particular truth. Rather he must enter into it, see what it had to offer, and then withdraw and go on to the next. Just as Marius momentarily rested with this, that, and the other philosophy and accepted what each had to offer in

the development of a many-sided culture, so too will Arnold. And he will begin with Maurice de Guérin.

In the essay on Maurice de Guérin, Arnold is returning to a youthful enthusiasm. He makes this clear in the opening paragraph of the essay by explaining how he first encountered Guérin some fifteen years before at the end of one of George Sand's novels, and how he used to pester his friends by declaiming, in the strangest possible pronunciation, sentences from his prose poem the "Centaur." Now two whole volumes of Guérin's *Reliquiae* have been published, and Arnold has a chance to test his youthful enthusiasm. He begins by laying down a generalization—that poetry has a grand interpretive power, a power of so dealing with nature as to awaken in us a full and intimate sense of it. He adds that "Poetry interprets in another way besides this," but at this point he does not mention what it is. Rather he goes on to give an account of Guérin's life and writing. This account shows him initially withdrawing into the society of Lamennais—which reminds us of Newman's group at Littlemore—to see if he had a religious vocation, but ultimately discovering that he did not, that he needed the free, fuller life of nature. Thus, he entered the world but was unable to live there by writing or teaching and slowly died of consumption. At this point Arnold returns to his generalization. Poetry is the interpreter of two worlds, the natural world and the moral world. "It was as the interpreter of the natural world that she had Guérin for her mouthpiece. To make magically near and real the life of Nature, and man's life only so far as it is part of that Nature, was his faculty; a faculty of naturalistic, not of moral interpretation." By comparing Guérin to Keats, Arnold extends the stricture to all Romantic poets. They are all dwellers in the forest glade, and though they are perfect within their kind, their kind was a limited one and we do well to pass beyond.

Arnold probably would not have written of Eugenie de Guérin if she had not been the sister of Maurice, but in her he found another person who lived in the forest glade, but this time the glade of the Roman Catholic religion. If she could have lived in this world with Joy, says Arnold, it would have been well, but she lacked the inner serenity of a St. Francis de Sales or a Fénelon, and the power of mind of a Pascal. Instead, something chafed within her, an inquietude, an ennui. True, her religion did not have the meanness and provinciality of its counterpart in England, but it did share with Protestantism the doctrine of the emptiness and sterility of human life. For this reason she was even less equipped than her brother to deal with the modern world, and though, like her brother, she had true distinction of mind, she also, like him, lived in an unreal world that had long since passed away. For this reason the seeker of Truth must also pass her by.

Not so with the next figure in Arnold's novel, Heinrich Heine, who is a true subject of the modern world. To ascertain this Arnold must take up the image of the River, which he introduced in the first chapter with the phrase "current of ideas," and ask where this river has gone. "To ascertain the master-current in the literature of an epoch," he says, "and to distinguish it from all minor currents, is one of the critic's highest functions." This is the more necessary because when the River of Life descends to the burning plain, its current is split, like that of the Oxus, into many channels, and Carlyle has said that the true channel in modern German literature, that which descends most directly from its great source in Goethe, is the romantic school—Tieck, Novalis, Richter. This Arnold denies. Heine is the great continuator of Goethe in the modern age, "a brave soldier in the war of liberation of humanity." In order to illustrate this he shows for several pages how Heine from his "mattress-grave" in Paris shot against the ramparts of Philistinism arrowy shafts of irony and satire. But then, having admired Heine's wit and daring, Arnold suddenly turns against him. "Dissolvents of the old European system . . . we must all be . . ." he says; "what we have to study is that we may not be acrid dissolvents of it." Heine was an acrid dissolvent, deficient not only in love, as Goethe says, but also in dignity and self-respect. Hence, though he was a brilliant soldier in the war of liberation of humanity, he was not, says Arnold, "an adequate interpreter of the modern world." He offers us "a half-result, for want of moral balance, and of nobleness of character and soul."

Therefore, Arnold passes on, and he comes to an essay that is too little known and too little regarded in this book, for it may properly claim to be the pivotal essay in the entire work. It is called "Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment," and as its title indicates, it is a contrast between the religious sentiment of the pagan world, as exemplified in Theocritus' fifteenth idyl and that of the mediæval world, as exemplified in St. Francis' "Canticle of the Sun." The former is the religion of pleasure, gay, natural, cheerful, and it is all very well, says Arnold, so long as things are going well. It served Heine beautifully during the early years of his life, but in old age, when he was sick and sorry, he took refuge in irony and satire. This, however, is a refuge for the few, not the many, and it is now asserted that the test of the satisfactoriness of a philosophy is its ability to minister to the many. In this, Christianity, the religion of sorrow, is vastly superior, but it too, in its extreme of otherworldliness, overruns the normal limits of humanity. Monte Alverno is as far from us as Pompeii, the Reformation as the Renaissance. For though "the poetry of later paganism lived by the senses and understanding," and though "the poetry of mediæval

5. *Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold*, ed. A. Dwight Culler (Boston, 1961), pp. ix-xv. The view is developed in my *Imagina-*

*tive Reason: The Poetry of Matthew Arnold* (New Haven, 1966).  
6. *Letters of MA to AHC*, p. 59.



Christianity lived by the heart and imagination," the "main element of the modern spirit's life is neither the senses and understanding, nor the heart and imagination; it is the imaginative reason." With this statement Arnold has moved beyond his initial historical analysis of alternating critical and creative periods into a perception of what the new creative period must be like. It must be a synthesis of the first period with the second, and this means that it must be a joy that takes suffering into account, and it must be available to the many as well as the few.

This essay marks the turning point in Arnold's *Essays in Criticism*, and with it there is a distinct change in method. For whereas in the three previous essays Arnold has begun with what he had to say in favor of his subject and then turned against him and showed wherein he was wanting, in the next two he begins with what he has to say against him and then turns to an account of his strengths. The essay on Joubert, for example, which is the next one in order, begins, "Why should we ever treat of any dead authors but the famous ones?" and then goes on to emphasize Joubert's obscurity, his retirement from active life, and the delicacy of his health. The mention of health points up another theme. Hitherto disease has been on the increase in the book, from the consumption of Maurice de Guérin, through the neurasthenia of his sister, to Heine's eight long years on his mattress-grave in Paris. The central essay, "Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment," was really entirely about suffering in the world and the adequacy of religion to deal with it. But now Joubert's valetudinarianism is presented in the early part of the essay, and by the time we reach the end we have no impression but of strength. Also, though Arnold begins by emphasizing Joubert's obscurity, he ends with a prediction of his fame. For Joubert is presented by Arnold primarily as a precursor of the new age. In one of those pregnant generalizations which mark out the background of Arnold's essays he says that there are but two kinds of authors who are safe in the general havoc. The first are the great abounding fountains—the Shakespeares, the Homers—and Joubert is not one of these. But the second are those of lesser power who will be recognized by the outskirmishers of the next generation, its quick-witted, light-armed troops, as being of the same sacred family, and so will be rescued and set aside. It is obvious that Arnold, who is now rescuing Joubert, is one of these quick-witted, light-armed troops, and as the essay proceeds, it is less about Joubert than about the process of Arnold's rescuing him. The central characteristic of Joubert is his "ardent impulse for seeking the genuine truth," and as Arnold quotes his words, he follows each quotation with the remark, "How true!" "How profoundly true!" In this way

Joubert becomes the type of the subterranean river, or Buried Life, which was forced underground in its own uncongenial day but is now reemerging to flow happily on to the sea.

The last two essays, on Spinoza and Marcus Aurelius, carry us on even further. That on Spinoza begins with the thunderous curse of excommunication pronounced upon him by the Jews of Amsterdam and so established him as "a child of modern Europe." It then continues with Arnold's complaint of the unsatisfactoriness of his writings on religion because he will not speak out and say clearly what he thinks about the Bible, and because he insists on putting his thoughts in an arid metaphysical form that will not appeal to the generality of men. But, says Arnold, if one turns to his Letters and the *Ethics*, then one learns what the real spirit and tendency of his work is. For he is not, as one critic has suggested, a member of the post-Hegelian scientific orthodoxy. This is evident from the fact that he makes the *summum bonum* of life the love of God. On the other hand, neither is he a Fra Angelico, for the love of God, for him, is a purely intellectual transport. He combines the heart and imagination with the senses and understanding into the imaginative reason, and because of this Arnold suggests that his works will soon be recognized for what they are—the central point in modern philosophy.

Finally, Marcus Aurelius goes beyond Spinoza by supplying the element of joy which was lacking in his arid metaphysical treatment. He was, says Arnold, "perhaps the most beautiful figure in history." Moreover, he was so, not in an age of medieval Catholicism, which made it easy for a Saint Louis or a King Alfred to be beautiful, but in an age essentially like our own, an age of imperial paganism. In such an age Epictetus could attain to morality but nothing more. Marcus Aurelius, however, could suffuse morality with something like the emotion of Christianity. Still, though he could suffuse morality with emotion, he could not light it up with emotion, as does the New Testament. In this respect he was imperfect, and Arnold ends the essay by noting that it is through this very imperfection that Marcus Aurelius appeals to men today. "It is because he, too, yearns as they do for something unattained by him." What if he had been able to enter into Christianity? "Vain question!" says Arnold, "yet the greatest charm of Marcus Aurelius is that he makes us ask it. We see him wise, just, self-governed, tender, thankful, blameless; yet, with all this, agitated, stretching out his arms for something beyond—tendentemque manus ripae ulterioris amore."

This is the last sentence in the essay, and it is also the last sentence in the book. We are struck by its resemblance to the last sentence in "The Function of Criticism at the

Present Time," where Arnold says, "There is the promised land, towards which criticism can only beckon. That promised land it will not be ours to enter, and we shall die in the wilderness." As this was the last sentence to be written by Arnold (apart from the Preface) one may say that Arnold had arrived in his quest at the point at which Marcus Aurelius had arrived in his. That point was Mt. Pisgah. Looking out over the valley, he sees in the distance the promised land which it will not be his to enter.

## Matthew Arnold's *Empedocles on Etna*

Charles Berryman

*Empedocles on Etna* is a better poem than Matthew Arnold thought it to be. The poem should be accepted and praised as a dramatization of Empedocles' complex and powerfully despairing mind. In 1853 Arnold was not willing to value a poem that was merely a "dialogue of the mind with itself."<sup>1</sup> Arnold's reason for the exclusion of *Empedocles on Etna* from the 1853 edition of his poems is explained in the well-known Preface. The poet describes the situation of Empedocles as one "in which the suffering finds no vent in action; in which a continuous state of mental distress is prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope, or resistance; in which there is everything to be endured, nothing to be done." Arnold therefore concludes that "no poetical enjoyment can be derived" from such a poem.<sup>2</sup>

Arnold's readers have often come to the opposite conclusion. Robert Browning was greatly pleased with *Empedocles*, and requested Arnold to have it reprinted in the 1867 edition of his poems.<sup>3</sup> Modern readers tend to agree with the judgment of Browning. Lionel Trilling argues that Arnold's rejection of the poem was motivated by personal considerations, and supported by faulty arguments.<sup>4</sup> Frank Kermode agrees that Arnold's attitude regarding the poem is "exasperating."<sup>5</sup> Walter Houghton has recently stated that "*Empedocles on Etna* is the most impressive poem of its length written in the Victorian period."<sup>6</sup>

Such praise would probably have embarrassed Arnold. The mere existence of the poem seemed always to discom-

In this he was not quite right, for he did enter it in "Obermann Once More" and *Literature and Dogma*. But in this book he did not. Here he has told the story of a seeker after Truth who left the forest glade of Romantic nature poetry and orthodox Christianity, fought through the wilderness of the modern world, and finally, moving forward from darkness into light, stood at last by the verge of the wide-glimmering sea. Who says that "No Arnold could ever write a novel"?

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fort him. Arnold's repeated disavowal of the poem's philosophy, and his repudiation of any similarity between himself and its protagonist, merely dramatize the separation of Arnold the poet and Arnold the critic. In the summer of 1849 one of Arnold's friends declared confidently that the poet was using Empedocles "for the drapery of his own thoughts."<sup>7</sup> Arnold later protests this view too loudly:

I have now, and no doubt had still more then, a sympathy with the figure Empedocles presents to the imagination; but neither then nor now would my creed, if I wished or were able to draw it out in black and white, be by any means identical with that contained in the preachment of Empedocles.<sup>8</sup>

Arnold makes this protest in 1867, and it is necessary for him to do so if he wants to support his transformation from a modern poet to a critic of "The Modern Element in Literature." The latter role demands, according to Arnold's own standard, the adoption of an impersonal mask. The despairing philosophy and the dramatic suicide of Empedocles could only embarrass the author of "Literature and Dogma." Arnold felt, or wanted to feel, that he had outgrown his frustrated and "morbid" poem. Perhaps he could understand the vexatious plight of Goethe, whose readers continued to identify him as the hero of *The Sorrows of Young Werther*.

The identification of Goethe with his desperate hero

1. "Preface to the Poems of 1853," *The Poetical Works of Matthew Arnold*, eds. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry (London, 1950), p. xvii. All quotations from the poem or the 1853 Preface are from this edition.  
2. *Ibid.*, p. xviii.  
3. *Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1848-1888*, ed. G. W. E. Russell (New York, 1900), I, 431.  
4. Lionel Trilling, *Matthew Arnold* (New York, 1939), pp. 150-54.

5. Frank Kermode, *The Romantic Image* (London, 1957).  
6. Walter Houghton, "Arnold's *Empedocles on Etna*," *Victorian Studies*, I (June 1958), 336.  
7. Letter of J. C. Shairp to A. H. Clough, in C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry, *The Poetry of Matthew Arnold, A Commentary* (London, 1940), p. 287.  
8. Letter to Henry Dunn, 1867, in *Commentary*, p. 288.



would be just as false as the simple equation of Arnold and Empedocles. Both fictional characters have biographical relevance, but each figure is carefully separated from the full sympathy of his author. The place to look for the separation is not in the subsequent life of the author, but rather in the conscious design of the particular work of art. The cold and flat style chosen for the scene of Werther's suicide conveys Goethe's criticism of the deed and his conscious separation from the character. The style is restrained to suggest judgment rather than sympathy.

Arnold's separation from his desperate hero can be seen in the poetic context designed to limit Empedocles. Lionel Trilling has described the poem as a dramatic juxtaposition of two contrasting styles of verse.<sup>9</sup> The prosaic diction and the harshly regular verse form of Empedocles are dramatically contrasted with the highly musical and gently persuasive poetry of Callicles. Empedocles laments man's limitation:

In vain our pent wills fret,  
And would the world subdue.  
Limits we did not set  
Condition all we do;  
Born into life we are, and life must be our mould.  
(I, ii, 182-86)

Against this bare and disillusioned philosophy Arnold places the lyric affirmation of Callicles:

for 'tis the last  
Of all the woody, high, well-water'd dells  
On Etna; and the beam  
Of noon is broken there by chestnut-boughs  
Down its steep verdant sides; the air  
Is freshen'd by the leaping stream, which throws  
Eternal showers of spray on the moss'd roots  
Of trees, and veins of turf, and long dark shoots  
Of ivy-plants, and fragrant hanging bells  
Of hyacinths, and on late anemonies,  
That muffle its wet banks. (I, ii, 41-51)

The lyric of Callicles has long been justly praised, but apparently no one has pointed out its agreement with the substance if not the sound of Empedocles' philosophy. Empedocles declares that "Limits we did not set / Condition all we do," and Callicles' description of the mountain confirms the limitation of life to a certain altitude. Callicles describes the "last of all the woody, high, well-water'd dells on Etna." The dell is vibrant with life and procreative energy: "verdant sides, freshen'd air, leaping streams, eternal showers," etc. But Callicles warns us ex-

PLICITLY about the inhuman reach of the mountain that rises above:

but glade,  
And stream, and sward, and chestnut trees,  
End here; Etna beyond, in the broad glare  
Of the hot noon, without a shade,  
Slope behind slope, up to the peak, lies bare.  
(I, ii, 51-55)

Thus Callicles shows his own awareness of limitation.

But Callicles, unlike the hero of the poem, is willing to accept the limitation. He climbs up the mountain until he reaches the side of the stream, where he stops and rests contentedly in the shade of the chestnut boughs. His acceptance of the resting place is unequivocal: "What mortal could be sick or sorry here?" The question, of course, brings Empedocles to mind. He is the one who cannot be content with the verdant shade of the well-water'd dell. He must climb up to the barren peak of Etna. Although Empedocles preaches the philosophy of limitation, he refuses himself to accept the limits. Although he declares "Born into life we are, and life must be our mould," Empedocles himself chooses death.

His choice must be understood in the dramatic context of the poem. The long philosophical speech of Empedocles is delivered to Pausanias halfway up the mountain. They stand just above the dell where Callicles is singing, and they can still hear the harp of Callicles and his lyric affirmation. Empedocles advises Pausanias to descend the mountain, and to resume a life of virtuous compromise. But Empedocles clearly does not intend to follow his own advice. The dramatic position halfway up the mountain between the life-suggestive dell and the death-threatening peak reveals the conflict within Empedocles.

The drama loses vitality if Empedocles' decision is made before he starts up the mountain. Then Arnold is correct in describing the situation as "a continuous state of mental distress . . . unrelieved by incident, hope, or resistance."<sup>10</sup> If the determined mind of Empedocles precludes the chance of psychological drama, the poem may still be considered dramatic, because the decision of Empedocles must be regarded with a double perspective. Although it is justified as necessary by Empedocles, it is criticized as madness by Callicles. Arnold's poem is a drama of these contrasting views.

Callicles is first allowed to denounce the poem's desperate hero. He first refers to Empedocles as "half mad with exile, and with brooding on his wrongs." Callicles would therefore condemn the final suicide as an act of madness. And madness is defined in the poem as the mistaken at-

tempt to transcend the prescribed limitations. When Pausanias blames the hostile age for Empedocles' embittered mind, Callicles transfers the blame to the man himself:

He is too scornful, too high-wrought, too bitter.  
'Tis not the times, 'tis not the sophists vex him;  
There is some root of suffering in himself,  
Some secret and unfollow'd vein of woe,  
Which makes the time look black and sad to  
him. (I, i, 149-53)

Callicles is quick to condemn the "man-hating mood" of Empedocles, and even accuses him of deceiving the people "whom he scorns." Thus Empedocles is first presented in a light that is far from sympathetic.

Despite their criticism of his attitude, both Callicles and Pausanias desire to save Empedocles. Their enduring regard for him, despite their agreement that he is mad, shows the reach of human loyalty that Empedocles must reject as he climbs toward the isolation of the mountain peak. He renounces all human sympathy when he leaves below him the last water'd dell on Etna.

The error of attempting to be superior to sympathy is explained by Callicles in the story of Apollo and Marsyas. The young Apollo cruelly demands the death of the faun as his reward for having won the contest. The Maenads plead for the poor faun to be spared, but the haughty Apollo will not listen to their plea. The superior figure is thus shown as inhumanly cruel. The same attitude of superiority is characteristic of Empedocles. He even says that he has loved the scornful ensign of Apollo. In telling the story Callicles instinctively takes the side of the poor faun, and thereby criticizes the proud and haughty Empedocles.

It is ironic that Callicles should be the one to criticize Empedocles, because the young man with the harp corresponds to the lost youth of the despairing hero. Empedocles confirms this relationship when he looks back nostalgically to the days when he was young:

Then we could still enjoy, then neither thought  
Nor outward things were closed and dead to us;  
But we received the shock of mighty thoughts  
On simple minds with a pure natural joy.  
(II, 240-43)

Although critics often mention the influence of Wordsworth in these lines, and it is certainly there, Empedocles is significantly looking at a past that is now dead to him. If Empedocles did experience the pure romantic joy in his youth, he is condemned in his old age to the mid-century Victorian "dialogue of the mind with itself."

The separation of youth and age lends further irony to the criticism of despair offered by Callicles. If Callicles represents the youth of the hero, it follows that Empedocles has already passed through that stage, and it also follows that Callicles himself will gradually inherit the despairing attitude that he now condemns. "Joy and the outward world must die to him, / As they are dead to me." Callicles is not yet aware that someday he himself will stand on the edge of Etna's crater. Arnold's poem thus implicitly dramatizes the progression from Romantic to Victorian, the loss of the "pure natural joy," and the final inheritance of doubt and despair. For Arnold the familiar romantic mountain top has become the setting of Empedocles' suicide.

Although Callicles accepts temporarily the limits controlling life, he also reveals the contrary motivation ruling Empedocles. In the lyric describing the fate of Cadmus and Harmonia it is shown why Empedocles cannot be content with the verdant dell halfway up the mountain. The blissful resting place of Cadmus and Harmonia is analogous to the last water'd dell on Etna. Arnold confirms the analogy with corresponding descriptions of the two places. Callicles pictures the happy retreat of Cadmus and Harmonia as "buoyant and fresh" with "mountain flowers / As virginal and sweet as ours." (I, ii, 433-34)

A further analogy exists between the careers of Cadmus and Harmonia and that of Empedocles. Cadmus and Harmonia have:

stayed long enough to see,  
In Thebes, the billow of calamity  
Over their own dear children roll'd  
Curse upon curse, pang upon pang,  
For years . . . (I, ii, 444-48)

and Empedocles also has outlived his power, and has suffered a corresponding isolation in Agrigentum. In his outline for the poem Arnold describes Empedocles—"his friends are dead; the world is all against him."<sup>11</sup>

Cadmus and Harmonia choose a respite from their fate in the happy glen. But the cost of their peace is great. They are free of "their first sad life . . . and all that Theban woe," but their freedom is "placid and dumb." Resting in the wooded dell on Etna would thus be a way of preserving life, but the form of life preserved would be a poor compromise. Empedocles is not willing to continue life on such terms. He advises Pausanias to do so, but compromise is more suitable to the obliging character of Pausanias.

"Refusal of limitation" is what Arnold wrote in his

9. Trilling, *Matthew Arnold*, pp. 82-83.

10. Preface to the *Poems of 1853*, *Poetical Works*, p. xviii.

11. *Commentary*, p. 291.



notes as the theme of the poem, and the suicide of Empedocles clearly illustrates this refusal.<sup>12</sup> The acceptance of limitation would mean continued existence in the happy glen of Cadmus and Harmonia where repose is placid and dumb. Empedocles must choose between complete negation and a twilight state of forgetfulness. The alternatives are present in a famous line by Tennyson—"The Lotus blooms below the barren peak"—that may have suggested the very setting of Arnold's poem. Empedocles must choose the barren peak, and leave the lotus land of forgetfulness and compromise to Harmonia and Cadmus and Pausanias. The alternatives presented to Empedocles preclude any vitally positive choice. Thus Arnold identifies the situation as one in which "there is everything to be endured, nothing to be done."

The motivation of Empedocles is explained in Arnold's outline of the poem. "He is a philosopher. He has not the religious consolation of other men, facile because adapted to their weaknesses, or because shared by all around and charging the atmosphere they breathe. He sees things as they are—the world as it is—God as he is: in their stern simplicity."<sup>13</sup>

The outline explains the necessary refusal of all limitations, but it gives Empedocles more certainty than he possesses in the poem. If he "sees all as they are," and the only possible result is suicide, then the author is justified in calling the situation dangerously "morbid." But the hero of the poem is uncertain, and the peak of the mountain is a highly ambiguous place. It is first described by Callicles as "the peak, round which the white clouds play." According to Empedocles the winds play with "the soul of man" as if it were a "gusty toy," and when he reaches the peak of the mountain his own soul is anything but steady. He adapts the fable of Typho as an example of his own oppression. He rationalizes that "great qualities are trodden down, / And littleness united / Is become invincible." But Callicles has told us early in the poem that "'Tis not the times, 'tis not the sophists vex him." On the edge of the crater Empedocles is making excuses, which negate the absolute clarity that Arnold's outline attributes to him. The character in the poem has greater dramatic complexity because he is not certain.

After adapting the fable of Typho for his own ends, Empedocles fancies the stars to be as cold and disillusioned as himself; but then he checks his thought, and admits his own responsibility—"I alone / Am dead to life and joy; therefore I read / In all things my own deadness." This confessed singularity of guilt is soon forgotten when Empedocles thinks of returning to the elements and the

endless cycle returning to "this uncongenial place, this human life." But Empedocles has just attributed life to the rest of the world that is denied to himself. Is his life alone uncongenial, or is all life? Empedocles cannot decide.

What Empedocles wants is this:

To see if we will poise our life at last,  
To see if we will now at last be true  
To our own only true, deep-buried selves,  
Being one with which we are one with the  
whole world. (II, 369-72)

And that is precisely what he told Pausanias it would be impossible to achieve. According to the philosophy of Empedocles, we can never be "one with the whole world." The only alternatives are compromise and suicide. The refusal to accept limitation leads to the bare mountain peak and the edge of the crater.

The value of either alternative is ambiguous. The sane compromise is made by the simple-minded Pausanias, while self-destruction is chosen by the greater character. The desperate refusal of limitation seems more heroic than the rational compromise. Empedocles is more impressive at the moment of his suicide than the "good, learned" Pausanias, who goes down the mountain to "bravelier front his live." Christianity resolves this paradox by rewarding the martyr with salvation in another world. But when Empedocles plunges into the crater calling "Receive me, save me!" there is nothing beyond annihilation.

Arnold's reluctance to identify himself with Empedocles, and his readiness to suppress the poem, indicate the poet's rapid growth in another direction. Arnold's friends could see in 1849 that the poet was using the figure of the Greek philosopher "for the drapery of his own thoughts," but they could not see at that time how the poet would soon develop into the critic by choosing a positive alternative beyond Empedocles. Arnold had good reason in 1853 to repudiate his negative poem.

But the reason he gives in his Preface is neither good nor accurate. He argues from Aristotle's theory of tragic effect that some dramatic action is needed to produce a necessary catharsis. He therefore condemns his poem "in which the suffering finds no vent in action." His judgment seems curiously to overlook the suicide of Empedocles. Does not the suicide effect the proper purgation demanded by Aristotle? We are prepared by Callicles to behold the final event with pity and fear. Whether or not the suicide of Empedocles may be considered as a resolution of the action, Lionel Trilling reminds us "there is a catharsis of ex-

pression, formulation and understanding as well as of action."<sup>14</sup> Arnold's poem is described by Trilling's extended definition. Arnold argues in his Preface that a "dialogue of the mind with itself" is not a proper subject for poetry. But his own poem refutes his argument. The long despairing speech of Empedocles, whether or not it is resolved in action, certainly provides a "catharsis of expression, formulation and understanding."

Readers of *In Memoriam* or Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* will be ready to admit the shortcoming of Arnold's theory of art requiring heroic action. Arnold's theory is a symptom of, and not a cure for, a modern condition. He describes his time as "an age wanting in moral grandeur, . . . an age of spiritual discomfort."<sup>15</sup> His demand for a poetic subject of heroic action is an early sign of his reactionary discontent with the modern rule of the anti-hero. Arnold's discontent is expressed repeatedly in his letters to Clough: "These are damned times—everything is against one . . . our physical enervation, the absence of great natures, the unavoidable contact with millions of small ones."<sup>16</sup>

In reaction to the indifference of the age, Arnold advises writers to rely on classical models of heroic action. Arnold's attempt to follow his own theory is the unfortunate "Sohrab and Rostum." The contrived heroism of an improbable death on the plain of Oxus only proves that

poems are not written according to critical theories. But the author of *Empedocles on Etna* is a poet. The genuine despair of Empedocles is better than the forced emotion of Sohrab. The tears of Sohrab are merely theatrical, while the thoughts of Empedocles are deep-rooted and irrepresible. *Empedocles on Etna* is a genuine response to modern difficulties that Arnold could not theorize away. The poem is a "dialogue of the mind with itself," and as such it anticipates much of modern literature.

Arnold's Preface of 1853 ironically accepts the doctrine of acquiescence that Empedocles preaches to the obliging Pausanias. The critic must advocate the rational acceptance of limitations. Arnold as critic shows how to accommodate the unheroic age. But Arnold as poet chose the opposite theme—"Refusal of limitation." When Arnold protests any similarity with Empedocles, he is repudiating his role as poet. The result is a shrinking of life into the bounds of rational compromise as illustrated by Pausanias and his course down the mountain. When Arnold as poet allows his imagination to speak the thoughts of Empedocles, the result is a poem that successfully dramatizes the mind of the despairing hero, more complexly than Byron's success with Manfred, and more powerfully than Arnold himself would acknowledge.

University of Southern California

## The George-Amelia-Dobbin Triangle in the Structure of *Vanity Fair*

Myron Taube

THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS why *Vanity Fair* has been thought to have no plot, or worse, no plan. The novel appeared first in serial form, and it is possible that "the spasmodic writing of monthly installments prevented good integration."<sup>1</sup> Thackeray himself wrote in the "Preface" to *Pendennis* that the serial novel "constantly does and must" fail in art, "although it may have the 'advantages of a certain truth and honesty, which a work more elaborate might lose.'<sup>2</sup> A novel the size of *Vanity Fair*, published the way it was, some critics say, "could hardly be symmetrical in form."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Thackeray's emphasis

was not on plot but on the revelation of character, on the development of the novel through the personal relationships of the characters. Time and time again, Thackeray told others that he felt toward his characters as toward real people, that he let them lead their own lives. He told John Cordy Jeaffreson, "I don't control my characters. I am in their hands and they take me where they please."<sup>4</sup> And James T. Fields wrote of Thackeray:

He told me that when he began a novel he rarely knew how many people were to figure in it, and,

Victorian Period (New York, 1949), p. 263.

2. *The Works of William Makepeace Thackeray*, ed. Anne Thackeray Ritchie (London, "Biographical Edition," 1897), II, xlvi.
3. Cornelius Weygandt, *A Century of the English Novel* (New York, 1925), p. 98.
4. Malcolm Elwin, *Thackeray: A Personality* (London, 1932), p. 220.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 291.

14. Trilling, *Matthew Arnold*, p. 153.

15. Preface to the Poems of 1853, *Poetical Works*, p. xxix.

16. *The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough*, ed. H. F. Lowry (London, 1932), Letter of 23 September 1849, p. 111.

1. John D. Cooke and Lionel Stevenson, *English Literature of the*



to use his own words, he was always very shaky about their moral conduct. He said that some times, especially if he had been dining late and did not feel in remarkably good-humor next morning, he was inclined to make his characters villainously wicked; but if he rose serene with an unclouded brain, there was no end to the lovely actions he was willing to make his men and women perform.<sup>5</sup>

Certainly, this view could even be supported by a statement Thackeray made in the "Preface to *Pendennis*: 'Perhaps the lovers of 'excitement' may care to know, that this book began with a very precise plan, which was entirely put aside.'" In fact, "up to nine o'clock" of the last day of writing, "my poor friend, Colonel Altamont, was doomed to execution, and the author only relented when his victim was actually at the window" (*Works*, II, xlvi). A statement like this damns an author in a literary world that, since Henry James, has been most aware of conscious intent and form—whatever this latter may be.

However, to accept these few statements as *the* word on the subject would be uncritical acceptance of what can be shown to be just the opposite. The fact of the matter is that for Thackeray, as for Henry James, the act of creation was a mystery that no amount of self-analysis would reveal. Despite James's highly conscious *attempt*, his explanations of his works—his analysis of their genesis, development, and critical value—really tell us very little about artistic creation. Thus it was with Thackeray. When a friend congratulated him on the thrill of admiration Becky felt when Rawdon gave Lord Steyne the punishment that led to her own downfall, Thackeray said, "Well, when I wrote the sentence, I slapped my fist on the table and said, 'That was a touch of genius!'"<sup>6</sup> There can be little questioning of an artist's inspiration: it comes from deep within, as a gush of clear water from a hidden source. As unsympathetic a critic as Greig saw this, too:

When Thackeray surrendered to the excitement of creation, his unconscious mind often took control. He once told Whitwell Elwin: "I have no idea where it all comes from. . . . I am often astonished myself to read it after I have got it on paper." This is as it should be; at any rate, as it seems to be with most of the greater artists, whether men of letters, painters, sculptors, or musicians: they draw from a well that is deeper than conscious memory.<sup>7</sup>

We must remember that by 1846, when Thackeray began to do serious work on *Vanity Fair*, he had been writing for almost a dozen years, and he knew the tricks of the trade. He could establish conflicts quickly, make a character come alive with a few quick strokes, and set a story *in his head*, so that when the time came to write it, he would have no trouble at all. Austin Dobson comments, "No doubt Thackeray must often have arranged in his mind precisely much that he meant to say. Such seems indeed to have been his habit."<sup>8</sup> This kind of mental composition is not unknown. John Milton, who was not a professional author in the same way that Thackeray was—he did not "earn a living" by writing, composed his verses the same way; when Milton built up a reservoir of poetry, he called his amanuensis, "saying he wanted to be milked."<sup>9</sup> Once, when Frederick Locker-Lampson met Thackeray "in the Green Part, Thackeray gently begged to be allowed to walk alone as he had some verses in his head which he was finishing."<sup>10</sup> We do not suggest that Thackeray composed in his mind a complete monthly issue of three or four chapters. However, we do feel that while writing his chapters and monthly parts, Thackeray still had in his mind the over-all pattern and design for the development of the novel: he knew in which direction it was going, and what it had to do.

We will analyze one part of *Vanity Fair*, the George-Amelia-Dobbin triangle, and try to show that Thackeray had a plan, that he knew what had to happen.

One of Thackeray's many anti-fiction-of-the-age devices was the death of the "hero," George Osborne, about half way through the novel. The climax of Chapter 32 (Number IX), the death of George is foreshadowed as early as Chapter 13 (Number IV). George visits Amelia and stands in the doorway a moment:

He beamed on her from the drawing-room door—magnificent, with ambrosial whiskers, like a god. Sambo, whose face as he announced Captain Osbin (having conferred a brevet rank on that young officer) blazed with a sympathetic grin, saw the little girl start, and flush, and jump up from her watching-place in the window; and Sambo retreated: and as soon as the door was shut, she went fluttering to Lieutenant George Osborne's heart as if it was the only natural home for her to nestle in. Oh, thou poor panting little soul! The very finest tree in the whole for-

est, with the straightest stem, and the strongest arms, and the thickest foliage, wherein you choose to build and coo, may be marked, for what you know, and may be down with a crash ere long. What an old, old simile that is, between man and timber.

Professor George H. Ford has chosen this passage as an example of "the most excruciating paragraphs," in which there is little that is sour and "the sugar syrup is apparently undiluted."<sup>11</sup> His choice is unfortunate, for Thackeray was not merely moralizing: he was saying that George would soon die. The tree image is noteworthy, for at the end of the last chapter, when Amelia calls Dobbin back, Dobbin is described as "the rugged old oak." Thus we have Thackeray's contrast between the dandy and the honest, unassuming gentleman, the fairest tree of the forest and the most rugged.

Between these two images, covering four hundred-odd pages and about sixteen years, is the complex George-Amelia-Dobbin triangle. From the very beginning, Dobbin is caught in a helpless triangular relationship: he loves Amelia, but Amelia loves George. Since there is no hope for himself, Dobbin, like a nineteenth-century Pandarus, makes Amelia happy by getting her George. There is no doubt that George is not happy with his marriage:

"A pretty way you have managed the affair," said George, looking savagely at William Dobbin. "Look there, Dobbin," and he flung over to the latter his parent's letter. "A beggar, by Jove, and all in consequence of my d—d sentimentality. Why couldn't we have waited? A ball might have done for me in the course of the war, and may still, and how will Emmy be bettered by being left a beggar's widow? It is all your doing. You were never easy until you had got me married and ruined. What the deuce am I to do with two thousand pounds? Such a sum won't last two years. I've lost a hundred and forty to Crawley at cards and billiards since I've been down here. A pretty manager of a man's matters *you* are, forsooth."

"There's no denying that the position is a hard one," Dobbin replied, after reading over the letter with a blank countenance; "and as you say, it is partly of my making. There are men who wouldn't mind changing with you," he added, with a bitter smile (Chapter 25; Number VII).

Yet as early as George and Amelia's honeymoon, Thackeray tells us that the marriage is not the end, that Amelia's relationship with Dobbin will change greatly. After telling Old Osborne of the marriage, Dobbin returns to Brighton:

Little Amelia, it must be owned, had rather a mean opinion of her husband's friend, Captain Dobbin. He lisped—he was very plain and homely-looking: and exceedingly awkward and ungainly. She liked him for his attachment to her husband (to be sure there was very little merit in that), and she thought George was most generous and kind in extending his friendship to his brother officer. George had mimicked Dobbin's lisp and queer manners many times to her, though, to do him justice, he always spoke most highly of his friend's good qualities. In her little day of triumph, and not knowing him intimately as yet, she made light of honest William—and he knew her opinions of him quite well, and acquiesced in them very humbly. A time came when she knew him better, and changed her notions regarding him; but that was distant as yet (Chapter 25).

Years later, when Dobbin takes Amelia and Georgy to Pumpnickel, Thackeray uses almost the same phrases he had used before to indicate that this was the time he had predicted:

He [Dobbin] had very long legs, a yellow face, and a slight lisp, which at first was rather ridiculous. But his thoughts were just, his brains were fairly good, his life was honest and pure, and his heart was warm and humble. He certainly had very large hands and feet, which the two George Osbornes used to caricature and laugh at; and their jeers and laughter perhaps led poor little Emmy astray as to his worth. But have we not all been misled about our heroes, and changed our opinions a hundred times? Emmy, in this happy time, found that hers underwent a very great change in respect of the merits of the Major (Chapter 62).

We know that Thackeray had a plan for Amelia's life from the time between these two opinions of Dobbin. When Number VII appeared (Chapters 23-25), Thackeray wrote to his mother that Amelia would get humility "when her scoundrel of a husband is well dead with a ball in his odious bowels; when she has had sufferings, a child, and a religion."<sup>12</sup> This certainly bears out our contention

5. *Yesterdays with Authors* (Boston, 1925), pp. 15-16.

6. Fields, p. 27.

7. J. T. Y. Greig, *Thackeray: A Reconsideration* (London, 1950), pp. 108-9.

8. *De Libris* (New York, 1908), p. 176.

9. Helen Darbishire, ed. *The Early Lives of Milton* (London, 1932), p. 33.

10. Dobson, p. 176.

11. "Introduction" to *Vanity Fair* (New York, Harper's Modern Classics, 1958), p. xvii.

12. *The Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace Thackeray*, ed. Gordon N. Ray (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), II, 309.



that the death of George did not just happen, and that Thackeray planned his story. George is killed at the end of Number IX (Chapter 32); Amelia's child is born in Number X (Chapter 35); she begins to suffer because of her selfishness in Number XI (Chapter 38); her greatest financial, social, and familial difficulties occur in Number XIII (Chapter 46); and her greatest emotional trial—the surrender of Georgy to his paternal grandfather—occurs in Number XIV (Chapter 50); her religion is modified during her stay in Pumpernickel (Number XVIII, Chapter 62).

Dobbin is brought back to England from India because of a remark in a letter from his sister that Amelia "is about to marry a reverend gentleman, the Rev. Mr. Binny, one of the curates of Brompton. A poor match. But Mrs. O. is getting old, and I saw a great deal of grey in her hair—she was in very good spirits." This letter ends Chapter 43 (the first chapter of Number XIII); but Dobbin does not appear again until the end of Number XVI (Chapter 56), when he arrives at Mr. Veal's academy. His entrance serves as a contrast, for Dobbin, who is Thackeray's idea of the gentleman, appears at the end of the chapter entitled "Georgy is Made a Gentleman." Dobbin, who had served as a contrast to the dandyism of George the father, now serves as contrast to the dandyism of George the son.

Because of his concern with the time and its effect on life and character, Thackeray creates a George the son who is a beginning again of George the father, with the concomitant feeling of life having been lived and being lived over. When George's sister Jane, who has had the life squeezed out of her by her father, first sees little Georgy, she comes home quite upset:

The woman burst into tears. "Oh, sir," she said, "I've seen little George. He is as beautiful as an angel—and so like him!" The old man opposite to her did not say a word, but flushed up, and began to tremble in every limb (Chapter 42).

Later, when the boy moves to his grandfather's house, he acts toward all about him exactly as his father did twenty years before. As a result,

everybody was afraid of Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Osborne was afraid of Georgy. The boy's dashing manners, and offhand rattle about books and learning, his likeness to his father (dead unrecorced in Brussels yonder), awed the old gentleman, and gave the young boy the mastery. The old man would start at some hereditary feature or tone unconsciously used by the little lad, and fancy that George's father was again before him. He tried by indulgence to the grandson to make up for harshness to the elder George (Chapter 56).

Old Osborne's cringing before the assumed airs of his grandson instantly reminds us of the scene in which the old man cringed before the boy's father after he had disobeyed orders and spoken out warmly in Amelia's favor:

The difference between the pair was, that while the father was violent and a bully, the son had thrice the nerve and courage of the parent, and could not merely make an attack, but resist it; and finding that the moment was now come when the contest between him and his father was to be decided, he took his dinner with perfect coolness and appetite before the engagement began. Old Osborne, on the contrary, was nervous, and drank much. He floundered in his conversation with the ladies, his neighbours: George's coolness only rendering him more angry. It made him half mad to see the calm way in which George, flapping his napkin, and with a swaggering bow, opened the door for the ladies to leave the room; and filling himself a glass of wine, smacked it, and looked his father full in the face, as if to say, "Gentlemen of the Guard, fire first." The old man also took a supply of ammunition, but his decanter clinked against the glass as he tried to fill it. . . .

Whenever the lad assumed his haughty manner, it always created either great awe or great irritation in the parent. Old Osborne stood in secret terror of his son as a better gentleman than himself; and perhaps my readers may have remarked in their experiences of this Vanity Fair of ours, that there is no character which a low-minded man so much mistrusts as that of a gentleman (Chapter 21).

Thackeray reinforces the idea that young George is his father beginning again by recreating in the people who surround him the same emotions they felt with his father. Thus, when Georgy comes to live with his grandfather, he is given the same room his father had before him. But it is a room in which time has stood still, just as in the reestablishment of the son-father relationship between Georgy and his grandfather, we have the feeling that despite the passage of time, we have moved back in time; that in a sense, time has again stood still. When Georgy is to come, the room is prepared:

It was George's room. It had not been opened for more than ten years. Some of his clothes, papers, handkerchiefs, ships and caps, fishing-rods and sporting gear, were still there. An army list of 1814, with his name written on the cover; a little dictionary he was wont to use in writing; and the Bible his mother had given him, were on the mantelpiece; with a pair of spurs, and a dried

inkstand covered with the dust of ten years. Ah! since that ink was wet, what days and people had passed away! The writing-book still on the table was blotted with his hand (Chapter 50).

But Georgy is not another George only to his grandfather; he is also another George to his mother. And here again we observe Thackeray's control of what E. K. Brown calls the "rhythm" of the novel.<sup>13</sup> When Georgy and Amelia are in his room, he points out something he has just observed:

"Look here, mother," said Georgy, "here's a G.O. scratched on the glass with a diamond; I never saw it before; I never did it."

"It was your father's room long before you were born, George," she said, and she blushed as she kissed the boy (Chapter 61).

Early in the novel, George writes a letter about the Cuff-Dobbin fight that reveals his natural selfishness:

Dear Mama,—I hope you are quite well. I should be much obliged to you to send me a cake and five shillings. . . . He [Cuff] has a white Pony to come and fetch him, and a groom in livery on a bay mare. I wish my Papa would let me have a Pony, and I am your dutiful Son,

George Sedley Osborne.

P.S.—Give my love to little Emmy. I am cutting her out a Coach in cardboard. Please not a seed-cake, but a plum-cake (Chapter 5).

Years later, Amelia treasures a composition by Georgy on selfishness. And here again is the irony with which the entire book is suffused: both Georges and Amelia are motivated by self-blinding selfishness. Amelia shows the composition to Dobbin. "This great effort of genius, which is still in the possession of George's mother," contains the following remarks:

Of all the vices which degrade the human character, Selfishness is the most odious and contemptible. An undue love of Self leads to the most monstrous crimes; and occasions the greatest misfortunes both in *States and Families*. As a selfish man will impoverish his family and often bring them to ruin: so a selfish king brings ruin on his people and often plunges them into war. . . . We see by these examples [Achilles and Napoleon] that we are not to consult our own interests and ambition, but that we are to consider the interests of others as well as our own (Chapter 58).

Early in the novel, George borrows money from Dobbin to buy Amelia a present:

And I dare say he would have bought something very handsome for Amelia; only, getting off the coach in Fleet Street, he was attracted by a handsome shirt-pin in a jeweler's window, which he could not resist; and having paid for that, had very little money to spare for indulging in any further exercise of kindness (Chapter 13).

Years later, this episode is repeated when, burdened by debts, Amelia has to cancel an order for Christmas clothes for Georgy:

Hardest of all, she had to break the matter to Georgy, who made a loud outcry. Everybody had new clothes at Christmas. The others would laugh at him. He *would* have new clothes. She had promised them to him. The poor widow had only kisses to give him. She darned the old suit in tears. She cast about among her little ornaments to see if she could sell anything to procure the desired novelties. There was her India shawl that Dobbin had sent her. She remembered in former days going with her mother to a fine India shop on Ludgate Hill, where the ladies had all sorts of dealings and bargains in these articles. Her cheeks flushed and her eyes shone with pleasure as she thought of this resource, and she kissed away George to school in the morning, smiling brightly after him. The boy felt that there was good news in her look (Chapter 46).

What Amelia surrendered unwittingly in the first episode, she gave willingly in the second; in both cases, she is the victim of a George Osborne, caught in the grip of a selfishness that she cannot or will not fight against.<sup>14</sup> And we see the irony in Amelia's ecstatic statement to Dobbin:

"O William," she added, holding out her hand to the Major—"what a treasure Heaven has given me in that boy! He is the comfort of my life—and he is the image of—of him that's gone!" (Chapter 58).

And for Dobbin Georgy is also a beginning again of the old George. When first introduced in Chapter 5, Dobbin is defending little George Osborne against the bully Cuff; after George's death, Dobbin serves as protector for the second George Osborne. He is the voice of conscience for both, and the gentlemanly contrast to their dandyism and boorishness. But time produces changes, and so there cannot be a perfect superimposition of one life upon the pattern of an earlier one. For example, the older George complained about Dobbin's "sermonizing" (Chapter 13);

13. *Rhythm in the Novel* (Toronto, 1950). See pp. 19-28.

14. For a fuller discussion of Amelia's psychology, see my article,

"The Character of Amelia in the Meaning of *Vanity Fair*" in *The Victorian Newsletter*, XVIII (Fall 1960), pp. 1-7.



but the young George is never preached to, and for good reason:

He was always respectful to Major Dobbin, however, and more modest in his demeanour when that gentleman was present. He was a clever lad, and afraid of the Major. George could not help admiring his friend's simplicity, his good-humour, his various learning quietly imparted, his general love of truth and justice. He had met no such man as yet in the course of his experience, and he had an instinctive liking for a gentleman. He hung fondly by his godfather's side; and it was his delight to walk in the Parks and hear Dobbin talk. William told George about his father, about India and Waterloo, about everything but himself. When George was more than usually pert and conceited, the major made jokes at him, which Mrs. Osborne thought very cruel. . . . (Chapter 60).

Here we see another George Osborne starting life, a different—but also very similar—George Osborne. The return of George in the person of his son thus continues the George-Amelia-Dobbin triangle. Just as Dobbin is forced to protect Amelia's interests in the first part of the novel, so he protects her and Georgy's interests in the last half of the novel. True, he does so partially because of natural inclination and partially because of the wills left by both George and Old Osborne. But in both triangles, Dobbin is the outsider. After the death of George, Amelia remains chained to the memory of her dead husband. As long as Amelia refuses to accept the truth about George's real character—done partly because of repression, partly because of ignorance—there can be no marriage to Dobbin. And it was fairly obvious to most sensitive Victorian novel readers that Dobbin was to marry Amelia. Abraham Hayward, who reviewed the novel after about twelve numbers, wrote:

Mr. Thackeray has kept his science and political economy (if he has any) for some other emergency, and given us a plain old-fashioned love-story, which any genuine novel of the old school may honestly, plentifully, and conscientiously cry over. . . . As regards Mrs. George Osborne, no intercession is needed; the precise lot we should have selected being obviously in store for her. She is to marry Major (or it may be Lieutenant-general, Sir William) Dobbin.<sup>15</sup>

So conscious was Thackeray of how the novel had to develop, that he prepared two different ways of disabusing Amelia of her infatuation with the dead/live George.

And although the first revelation, by Dobbin, is made inadvertently, the second, by Becky, is made almost gratuitously; both are carefully prepared for and developed throughout the novel. In fact, the failure of Dobbin's revelation to shock Amelia into awareness necessitates the shift of scene from London to Pumpnickel. More important, the need for the trip (Number XVIII) was prepared for as far back as Number V (Chapter 17), and no later than Number VIII (Chapter 29).

Chapters 17, 18, and 59—"How Captain Dobbin Bought a Piano," "Who Played on the Piano Captain Dobbin Bought?" and "The Old Piano"—all deal in some way with the piano Dobbin bought at the bankruptcy auction of Sedley's household goods and sent to Amelia. This bankruptcy had a strange double effect:

Of all Sedley's opponents in his debates with his creditors which now ensued, and harassed the feelings of the humiliated old gentleman so severely, that in six weeks he oldened more than he had done for fifteen years before—the most determined and obstinate seemed to be John Osborne, his old friend and neighbour—John Osborne, whom he had set up in life—who was under a hundred obligations to him—and whose son was to marry Sedley's daughter. Any one of these circumstances would account for the bitterness of Osborne's opposition (Chapter 18).

Osborne broke off the engagement of Amelia to George, "and as the poor girl's happiness and perhaps character were compromised, it was necessary to show the strongest reasons for the rupture, and for John Osborne to prove John Sedley to be a very bad character indeed" (Chapter 18). And John Sedley felt a reciprocal hatred for Osborne:

Whenever old John Sedley thought of the affair between George and Amelia, or alluded to it, it was with the bitterness almost as great as Mr. Osborne himself had shown. He cursed Osborne and his family as heartless, wicked, and ungrateful. No power on earth, he swore, would induce him to marry his daughter to the son of such a villain, and he ordered Emmy to banish George from her mind, and to return all the presents and letters which she had ever had from him (Chapter 18).

Because of these antagonisms, the arrival of the piano, a tangible symbol of George's affection, causes some agitation. However, Dobbin does not enlighten the Sedleys about the source of the gift:

The good-natured fellow had found Mrs. Sedley only too willing to receive him, and greatly agitated by the arrival of the piano, which, as she conjectured, *must* have come from George, and was a signal of amity on his part. Captain did not correct this error of the worthy lady.

And when Amelia sends back her few presents from George, she adds as postscript, "I shall often play upon the piano—your piano. It was like you to send it" (Chapter 18).

Despite Dobbin's emotional involvement throughout the first two "piano chapters," Thackeray makes us feel that he is fighting involvement. He achieves this effect by making Dobbin suppress his own emotions, and by making him move in the background of the action, while focusing on the emotional relationship between George and Amelia. Thus, after the auction, "when Rawdon and his wife wished to communicate with Captain Dobbin at the sale, and to know particulars of the catastrophe which had befallen Rebecca's old acquaintances, the Captain had vanished; and such information as they got was from a stray porter or broker at the auction." And the chapter ends with a discussion between Rawdon and Becky of what will happen next to the two lovers:

"What d'ye-call 'em—Osborne, will cry off now, I suppose, since the family is smashed. How cut up your pretty little friend will be; hey, Becky?"

"I dare say she'll recover it," Becky said, with a smile—and they drove on and talked about something else (Chapter 17).

Likewise, despite the fact that Dobbin had bought the piano and carried messages back and forth to get Amelia and George together, the climactic action of Chapter 18 focuses not on Dobbin, but on George.

Thus we see that the piano has two different values, depending on which story it is part of—the Amelia-George or the Amelia-Dobbin. Amelia saves the piano because of its emotional value for her, even when she gives away all her other possessions:

Emmy, when she went away from Brompton, endowed Mary with every article of furniture that the house contained: only taking away her pictures (the two pictures over the bed) and her piano—that little old piano which had now passed into a plaintive jingling old age, but which she loved for reasons of her own. She was a child when first she played on it: and her parents gave it her. It had been given to her again since, as the reader may remember, when her father's house was gone to ruin, and the instrument was recovered out of the wreck.

She values the piano in its Amelia-George context. When Dobbin sees it, and hears how much Amelia values it, he accepts it in its Amelia-Dobbin context. Thackeray uses this double-value symbol to produce a revelation of prime importance:

When the men appeared then bearing this old music-box, and Amelia gave orders that it should be placed in the chamber aforesaid, Dobbin was quite elated. "I'm glad you've kept it," he said in a very sentimental manner. "I was afraid you didn't care about it."

"I value it more than anything I have in the world," said Amelia.

"Do you, Amelia?" cried the Major. The fact was, as he had bought it himself, though he never said anything about it, it never entered into his head to suppose that Emmy should think anybody else was the purchaser, and as a matter of course he fancied that she knew the gift came from him. "Do you, Amelia?" he said; and the question, the great question of all, was trembling on his lips, when Emmy replied—

"Can I do otherwise?—did not he give it me?"

"I did not know," said poor old Dob, and his countenance fell.

Amelia does not understand the meaning of this episode until some time later. Her response is a classic type of rejection:

then it struck her, with inexpressible pain and mortification too, that it was William who was the giver of the piano; and not George, as she had fancied. It was not George's gift; the only one which she had received from her lover, as she thought—the thing she had cherished beyond all others—her dearest relic and prize. She had spoken to it about George; played his favourite airs upon it; sate for long evening hours, touching, to the best of her simple art, melancholy harmonies on the keys, and weeping over them in silence. It was not George's relic. It was valueless now. The next time that old Sedley asked her to play, she said it was shockingly out of tune, that she had a headache, that she couldn't play (Chapter 59).

Thackeray here shows a keen insight into Amelia's psychology. When she decides that the piano is valueless, Amelia is really making a judgment on her past life; she is admitting that the man she married was not what he seemed to be, just as the piano, "her dearest relic and prize" was not "George's relic." But the piano has not changed because of this revelation, only Amelia's attitude toward it. Unwilling to accept the value of the piano in its

15. *Edinburgh Review*, LXXXVII (January 1848), pp. 53, 60.



Amelia-Dobbin context, for she would thereby have to accept the truth of George's character, Amelia rejects the piano: "It is out of tune." And the psychic tensions caused by the repression of the old truth that again forces itself into her awareness cause her pain. Notice, when she apologizes to Dobbin:

"About—about that little square piano. I never thanked you for it when you gave it me; many, many years ago, before I was married. I thought somebody else had given it. Thank you, William." She held out her hand; but the poor little woman's heart was bleeding; and as for her eyes, of course they were at their work.

These psychic pressures are not without physical symptoms: "she had a headache . . . she couldn't play" (Chapter 59).

This rejection of Dobbin by Amelia was not unexpected. Thackeray had planned it, and had also prepared another means of making Amelia see the truth. But she had to go to the continent. Why? Because Becky Sharp is there. After the great discovery scene, in which Rawdon finds Becky and Lord Steyne together, Becky is an outcast. The only alternative to "scandal, separation, Doctors' commons," was Becky's exile; "it was Mr. Wenham's business, Lord Steyne's business, Rawdon's, everybody's—to get her out of the country, and hush up a most disagreeable affair" (Chapter 64). Since social pressures dictate that Becky leave the country, it is inevitable that Amelia will soon follow; inevitable, that is, because of the way that Thackeray structures the story. For we know that Becky has in her possession a document that will reveal to Amelia the true nature of her deceased husband's character.

At the ball the night before the battle of Waterloo, George leaves Amelia sitting alone while he fawns and flutters over Becky. Finally, George comes back, but not to see his wife:

. . . George came back for Rebecca's shawl and flowers. . . George went away then with the bouquet; but when he gave it to the owner, there lay a note, coiled like a snake among the flowers. She had been used to deal with notes early in life.<sup>16</sup> She put out her hand and took the nosegay. He saw by her eyes as they met, that she was aware what she should find there. . . . George

bowed over the hand, said nothing in reply to a remark of Crawley's, did not hear it even, his brain was so throbbing with triumph and excitement, and allowed them to go away without a word (Chapter 29).

Thackeray makes no secret about Becky's possession of the letter. When the troops move out to fight at Waterloo, Becky too prepares for action. She

was still in her pretty ball-dress, her fair hair hanging somewhat out of curl on her neck, and the circles round her eyes dark with watching. "What a fright I seem," she said, examining herself in the glass, "and how pale this pink makes me look!" So she divested herself of this pink raiment; in doing which a note fell out from her corsage, which she picked up with a smile, and locked into her dressing-box. And then she put her bouquet of the ball into a glass of water, and went to bed, and slept very comfortably (Chapter 30).

When Becky smiles, we know why she keeps the letter: it gives her power over Amelia and George. And we remember back some twenty chapters to the self-evaluation Becky had made:

"I am alone in the world," said the friendless girl. . . . "Well, let us see if my wits cannot provide me with an honourable maintenance, and if some day or the other I cannot show Miss Amelia my real superiority over her. Not that I dislike poor Amelia: who can dislike such a harmless, good-natured creature? only it will be a fine day when I can take my place above her in the world, as why, indeed, should I not?" (Chapter 10).

The day after the ball, Becky visits Amelia and finds her in a state close to hysteria:

"Why are *you* here, Rebecca?" she said, still looking at her solemnly with her large eyes. These glances troubled her visitor.

"She must have seen him give me the letter at the ball," Rebecca thought. "Don't be agitated, dear Amelia," she said, looking down. "I came but to see if I could—if you were well."

"Are you well?" said Amelia, "I dare say you are. You don't love your husband. You would not be here if you did. Tell me, Rebecca, did I

ever do you anything but kindness?"

"Indeed, Amelia, no," the other said, still hanging down her head.

"When you were quite poor, who was it that befriended you? Was I not a sister to you? You saw us all in happier days before he married me. I was all in all then to him; or would he have given up his fortune, his family, as he nobly did to make me happy? Why did you come between my love and me? Who sent you to separate those whom God joined, and take my darling's heart from me—my own husband? Do you think you could love him as I did? His love was everything to me. You know it, and wanted to rob me of it. For shame, Rebecca; bad and wicked woman—false friend and false wife."

"Amelia, I protest before God, I have done my husband no wrong," Rebecca said, turning from her.

"Have you done *me* no wrong, Rebecca? You did not succeed, but you tried. Ask your heart if you did not."

She knows nothing, Rebecca thought (Chapter 31).

Thackeray carefully points out the importance of the letter. The next day, Becky does not feel like visiting Amelia:

She clipped the bouquet which George had brought her, and gave fresh water to the flowers, and read over the letter which he had sent her. "Poor wretch," she said, twirling round the little bit of paper in her fingers, "how I could crush her with this!—and it is for a thing like this that she must break her heart, forsooth—for a man who is stupid—a coxcomb—and who does not care for her. My poor good Rawdon is worth ten of this creature." And then she fell to thinking what she should do if—if anything happened to poor good Rawdon, and what a great piece of luck it was that he had left his horses behind (Chapter 32).

Years later, as Becky moves up in the world and becomes involved with Lord Steyne, Thackeray refers twice in the same chapter to the secret hiding place in the desk:

The diamonds, which had created Rawdon's admiration, never went back to Mr. Polonius, of Coventry Street, and that gentleman never applied for their restoration; but they retired into a little private repository, in an old desk, which Amelia Sedley had given her years and years ago, and in which Becky kept a number of useful and, perhaps, valuable things, about which her husband knew nothing (Chapter 48; notice also the last paragraph of the chapter).

Thackeray again reminds us that Becky has the letter in her desk when Rawdon ransacks Becky's room after the discovery scene:

Rebecca gave him all the keys but one: and she was in hopes that he would not have remarked the absence of that. It belonged to the little desk which Amelia had given her in early days, and which she kept in a secret place. But Rawdon flung open boxes and wardrobes, throwing the multifarious trumpery of their contents here and there, and at last he found the desk. The woman was forced to open it. It contained papers, love-letters many years old—all sorts of small trinkets and woman's memoranda (Chapter 53).

When Becky is forced to leave Paris, she goes to Brussels:

She went to Waterloo and to Laeken, where George Osborne's monument much struck her. She made a little sketch of it. "That poor Cupid!" she said; "how dreadfully he was in love with me, and what a fool he was! I wonder whether little Emmy is alive" (Chapter 64).

Later, Becky understands the mistake Amelia makes in rejecting Dobbin. When Amelia says she could not forget George, Becky rebukes her:

"Look there, you fool," Becky said, still with provoking good humour, and taking a little paper out of her belt, she opened it and flung it into Emmy's lap. "You know his handwriting. He wrote that to me—wanted me to run away with him—gave it me under your nose, the day before he was shot—and served him right!" Becky repeated.

Emmy did not hear her; she was looking at the letter. It was that which George had put into the bouquet and given to Becky on the night of the Duchess of Richmond's ball. It was as she said: the foolish young man had asked her to fly (Chapter 67).

There can be little doubt that the George-Amelia-Dobbin story was carefully constructed. At the beginning—before the novel begins, in fact—is the engagement of Amelia to George; at the end is the marriage to Dobbin; and in the middle is the death of George and the beginning again of George in his son. And woven into the narrative are the devices to bring the novel to a "happy conclusion." In this respect, *Vanity Fair* differs from most serial novels, of which Kathleen Tillotson writes, "often the end was not even written, perhaps not predeter-

16. We remember Becky's correspondence with the Rev. Mr. Crisp while she is at Chiswick (Chapter 2); and the wonderful scene in which Rawdon slips a note between the leaves of the music Becky is playing. She stops, and "rising and looking him steadily in the face, took up the triangular missive daintily, and waved

it about as if it were a cocked hat, and she advancing to the enemy, popped the note into the fire." The interruption wakes Miss Crawley, who asks: "What's that?" "It's a false note," Miss Sharp said with a laugh; and Rawdon Crawley fumed with rage and mortification" (Chapter 11).



mined."<sup>17</sup> And here again we see Thackeray's basic realism: the letter is right out of the tradition of hidden wills and lost letters, but note the difference: Thackeray integrates the device into the structure of the story. Usually, the will or letter is found in the last chapter, but has not been mentioned before; or, if it has been mentioned, is introduced obliquely and quickly forgotten. But Thackeray makes it part of Becky's character: she saves the letter because it gives her power, and because it is a love letter. The old fictional device is made part of the character of

the user, and not pulled, like the proverbial rabbit, out of the hat.

While it is true that "one who begins a story without knowing how it is to end may invite disaster,"<sup>18</sup> Thackeray was well aware of the conclusion of his novel. His treatment and development of the George-Amelia-Dobbin story reveals a carefully constructed set of personal and causal relationships. Despite serial publication, this part of the novel was not "without a plan."

Kutztown State College

## Browning's Duke as Theatrical Producer

W. David Shaw

"MY LAST DUCHESS" occupies the same position in Browning's canon as *Hamlet* does in Shakespeare's. Its power resides in its endless suggestiveness, its play of enigmatic forces that continue to seduce and inspire its subtlest critics. Some of the poem's best commentators believe that the Duke delivers his speech as a warning that he wants the envoy to convey to his future wife. Professors Brown and Bailey summarize this view when they state that the Duke "expects from his bride single-hearted, worshipful loyalty, and will tolerate no less. He tells the story of his last duchess as a subtle means of making this point."<sup>1</sup> But other penetrating critics have objected that the Duke is more interested in obtaining a dowry than a submissive wife, and if the envoy were to report this speech to the Count's daughter it is unlikely that the dowry would be forthcoming. It is possible, of course, that the daughter would have no choice in the matter, since Italian women of the sixteenth century were still treated as chattel on the marriage market. But if this is the case, there would then be even less reason to suppose that the Duke is delivering his speech as a warning. To do so under such circumstances would be to grant the possibility of an unruly chattel and to suggest that the marital rights of a duke do not necessarily express any objective reality. On the other hand, the Duke is too adroit and sophisticated to indulge in plain effrontery. It would not be in character for

the Duke crudely and openly to challenge the envoy to report this story if he dared.

Thomas Assad<sup>2</sup> argues that the Duke stoops to reveal a domestic frustration because it enables him to demonstrate his knowledge of art. But the role of art is not as important in "My Last Duchess" as it is in "Fra Lippo Lippi" or "Andrea del Sarto." One cannot help feeling that Mr. Assad has mistaken a subordinate theme for the primary one. After all, could a mere taste for appreciating art make the Duke do what "he claims he never chooses to do, and that is to stoop?"<sup>3</sup> Neither B. R. Jerman's thesis that the Duke is witless<sup>4</sup> nor Robert Langbaum's hypothesis of the Duke's insanity<sup>5</sup> can explain convincingly why the Duke should volunteer all the shocking information that he does. As in a portrait of Pontormo, there is a presumption of superiority in the Duke's manner that will accept no question from the outside world, nor admit any satisfaction of our curiosity. Indeed the usual role of speaker and reader is reversed: the reader, like the envoy, feels that he, and not the Duke, is being inspected. The critic's inquiring gaze into the Duke is at first rejected, nor does it disclose any simple explanation of his motives.

I believe that the clue to this mystery lies in an area that other critics have indicated, but that no one seems to have explored at sufficient length. Commentators have sensed that the Duke is staging a "show" for the envoy by

drawing and closing curtains and speaking rhetorically. But because they have paid too little attention to the Duke's language and gestures, they have not generally recognized the full extent to which the speaker is involved in a drama of social pretension—of ceremonious posturing, play acting, and verbal artifice. The ceremony is part of the stagecraft. The Duke has been like the producer of a play till life (in the form of his Duchess' admirers) moved into his theatre and set up its counter-play. Isolated by the greedy idolatries of his producer's art, the Duke's theatrical self has fiercely willed the extinction of every other self. Now, in the perfect theatre of the dramatic monologue, with the envoy as his captive audience, the Duke must re-stage the uneven drama of his domestic life in the form most flattering to his producer's ego. He is at last ready to give the faultless performance that, as we gradually infer, he has never had the absolute mastery to stage in real life.

Our recognition of the Duke's theatrical art depends, in the first place, upon a sensitivity to his style. His ceremonious rhetoric stages a succession of disdainful, grandly arbitrary displacements of the sensitive, spontaneous, and rationally humane. Each of these stylistic displacements is also a stroke of dramatic art; and, together, they unite within a shell of singular refinement the hauteur of an aesthete, the debasement of a devious negotiator, the arrogance of a god.

The opening lines have a sweep of godlike omnipotence. The Duke's lordly gesture "calls" into being, as though by a fiat of divine creation, an acknowledged "wonder."

I call

That piece a wonder, now: Fra Pandolf's hands  
Worked busily a day, and there she stands.

The paratactic syntax sounds impressively oracular. Like Belinda's echo of *Genesis* ("Let Spades be trumps! she said, and trumps they were"),<sup>6</sup> the very grammar invites a Biblical parody. The Duke has dazzled his auditor with a magnificent opening, and fully conscious of the effect he has made, he can now afford to descend from this plateau of ceremony, with its operatic pointing at the picture, to a drawing-room atmosphere of mere formality. In extending his civilities to the envoy, this autocratic spellbinder, while choosing "Never to stoop" himself, becomes a subtle social parody of the Christian God of Browning's St. John who "stoops to rise . . . Such ever was love's way."<sup>7</sup> The Duke pretends to "stoop," not out of love (for his melodramatic pretensions exclude the imagination of love), but only out of a selfish desire to dramatize his own importance.

The speaker is producing a play in which the envoy must act his proper role. Thus the profession of feeling in "Will't please you sit" is offset by the Duke's self-important quotation of himself ("I said") and by the studied artifice of "by design." Feeling is further displaced by the classificatory instinct of "Strangers like you" and by the placid rationality of the causal "for," as though the envoy were simply another statistic, his response a calculated theatrical effect, something which the Duke has already predicted with scientific accuracy. An austere note enters with the aggressive insolence of the first parenthesis: "(since none puts by / The curtain I have drawn for you, but I)." Its lordly and audacious temper is a theatrical triumph that further accentuates the displacement of tone in the slightly acrid "Strangers like you," and that reaches a minor climax in the insolent threat casually tossed off at the end of line eleven. His lofty rhetoric corresponds in the social realm to the sublime in the aesthetic: each is tinged with as much terror as dignity. The repetitions of the personal pronoun ("As they would ask me," "But to myself they turned"), the studied indifference of the parenthesis, which is really a stage direction, and, above all, the frightful brevity of the arresting "if they durst," which owes half its power to its appearance as a careless afterthought, all enable the Duke to glory in an authority that the Duchess' spontaneity never allowed him to possess while she was alive. The very disparity of the rhymes "breast" and "West," which the heroic couplet brings into one web of sense, confirms our suspicion that the Duke lacked this mastery in his married life. The rhymes, which are irrational satellites revolving round the rhetoric, imply that, like "the dropping of the daylight," the Duchess' "breast" had indeed become for him a sinking sun. In order to dramatize his complete possession of the Duchess' "smile" the Duke in his little play takes keen delight in turning that smile on and off, merely by pulling a rope, with all the absorption of a child with his toy. But from what he proceeds to say we gather that the Duchess would never have allowed the curtain to be drawn over her in real life.

In the over-symmetrical fashion in which he strikes attitudes before the envoy, the catalogs now introduce a certain automatism into his voice.

Sir, 'twas all one! My favor at her breast,  
The dropping of the daylight in the West,  
The bough of cherries some officious fool  
Broke in the orchard for her, the white mule  
She rode with round the terrace—all and each  
Would draw from her alike the approving speech,  
Or blush, at least.

17. *Novels of the Eighteen-forties* (London, 1954), p. 26.

18. Grant C. Knight, *The Novel in English* (New York, 1935), p. 100.

1. *Victorian Poetry*, eds. E. K. Brown and J. O. Bailey (New York, 1962), p. 774.

2. Thomas Assad, "Browning's 'My Last Duchess,'" *Tulane Studies in English*, X (1960), 117-28.

3. Assad, p. 124.

4. B. R. Jerman, "Browning's Witless Duke," *PMLA* (1957), pp. 488-93.

5. Robert Langbaum, *The Poetry of Experience* (London, 1957), p. 85.

6. Pope, "The Rape of the Lock," Canto III: cf. "Let there be light: and there was light."

7. "A Death in the Desert," p. 134.



The repetitions of the definite article, reinforced by the use of "alike," "all and each," are highly suggestive of those robot-like mechanics that completely define in social terms the emotional vacuity of the Duke and the fabricated conventionality within which the Duchess is trapped. Hence the mechanical feel of the monologue as a whole: the *dramatis personae* are puppets obediently intertwining themselves in patterns set by the Duke's "despotic" theatrical ideal. Even the grammatical structure of the sentence, implying by its additive mode of simple enumeration the failure of the Duchess to discriminate any ranking among the parts, clashes ironically with the Duke's punctilious gradation of the content, ranging from his all-important "favor at her breast," through the "dropping of the daylight" and the "bough of cherries," to the "white mule" at the end. In scrupulously ordering the stage properties from the greatest to least in dignity the Duke is using the rhetorical figure of *catacosmesis* to emphasize the Duchess' failure of dramatic sense. But because the list exaggerates the dependence of the Duke's patronizing manners upon hierarchical forms, it inadvertently redounds on his own egoism.

What is most repulsive in the Duke's manner is the calous precision of an insane rationalist. The Duke casts his critique of the instinctive and humane into the brainlessly analytic mode of a social geometer.

Just this

Or that in you disgusts me; here you miss,  
Or there exceed the mark.

The speaker has the hypersensitive nerves of an infallible producer and rejects as vulgar any rational discussion with his star performer. His moral calculus transforms the rationality of the Duchess into the impudence of a saucy schoolgirl, "plainly" setting "Her wits to [his]," as though chopping logic with her master. By way of a transitional "Oh sir," as though to anticipate and forestall the mingled outrage and amazement of his auditor, the Duke passes to a fleeting reminder, in the two words "she smiled," of the Duchess' instinctive humanity. The jealous producer finds intolerable the spontaneous warmth of an actress who dares move beyond the role in which he has cast her by extending to others "Much the same *smile*." The third and final use of the word "smile" communicates in a lightning stroke of theatrical daring the full extent of the Duke's despotism. "This grew; I gave commands; / Then all *smiles* stopped together." At this point the reader realizes he has been tricked by the appearance of syllogistic progression. The Duke conceals his deviation from an expected line of reasoning till the reversal comes at a single blow. His dissociation of logical forms like the syllogism from their human content is a striking

rhetorical device, what Kenneth Burke has called "a kind of mild schizophrenia," which enables the Duke to speak blithely of barbarous deeds. The strident *asyndeton* (cf. "I came, I saw, I conquered") shifts at once from the height of cruelty into a producer's sensitive appreciation of the Duchess' portrait, valued by the Duke now, in his theatrical performance before the envoy, as his most striking stage property.

The Duke surprises us at the end by displaying a melodramatic concern over trivia. Manifesting every outward sign of self-effacing civility, he steps back to allow the deferential envoy to accompany him, as a social equal, out of the room. This unexpected courtesy no doubt stupefies the envoy. For all his moral outrage, the envoy, like the reader, is probably beguiled by the Duke's playacting and secretly flattered as well as horrified to walk by his side. The Duke's condescension is devoid of feeling, of course. It is a subtle theatrical trick, a way of affirming the pride it seems to qualify. For only the arrogant aristocrat who chooses "Never to stoop" can afford to stoop at all without loss of dignity. Hence the weird feel of the social playacting; everything moves by mysterious theatrical convention. The envoy and the Duchess are puppets controlled by unseen machinery, and even the Duke in extending civilities to a menial he despises seems to be speaking by ventriloquism.

The final picture of the Duke, pointing with a grand gesture to his statute of Neptune boldly "Taming a sea-horse," immediately brings to mind the contrasting picture of the Duchess, riding round the terrace on her mule. The mule and the sea-horse are superficially appropriate to the Duchess and the Duke, respectively. But if the Duke identifies himself with the lusty Neptune, mastering the unruly beast, it is the Duchess herself who must figure as the sea-horse—submissive only in death, as the sea-horse is in art, whereas she has always been indomitable in real life.

For, as we have seen, the Duke reveals just enough about the Duchess to indicate that she would not allow the curtain to be drawn over her while alive. By reducing his frustrations to the theatrics of social playacting the Duke's speech is a way of reenacting, and in this way of artfully discharging, the real humiliation that he has suffered in his last marriage, and that has been revived on the present occasion by the distasteful act of having to "stoop" to negotiate another marriage—to a mere Count's daughter—and with a social inferior at that. Browning has not chosen his auditor casually. The envoy on his marriage mission is precisely the person to revive the Duke's memories of his last marriage. As an emissary of a count he is important enough to give the Duke a sense of power in manipulating his responses, yet at the same time insignificant

enough to remove any of the Duke's fears that his puppet might take on independent life. The envoy's mission revives traumatic memories from the Duke's past. But they are memories that, once revived, the Duke can now continue and correct before a submissive auditor who enables him to transform the past into what it ought to have been.

The Duke's theatrical indirection is really a psychological complexity, for what could be more profoundly dramatic than Freud's notion of compulsive or obsessive behavior that attains expression by theatrical subterfuges designed to evade traumatic psychological experiences, often sexual in their origin? The Duke's behavior conforms precisely to Freud's classic analysis of the obsessional neurosis.<sup>8</sup> It is a transformation and correction of the domestic situation giving rise to his obsession. The ceremonious rhetoric, matchlessly contrived to secure, from the first lordly gesture to the final impudent levity, a breathtaking progression of dramatic shocks, keeps suggesting that the Duke is playacting, and that however reprehensible he may really be, he is not Satanic in the grand Miltonic way that he would like the envoy and the reader to believe. As Robert Langbaum finely says, the last ten lines "produce a series of shocks that outstrip each time our understanding of the duke, and keep us panting after revelation."<sup>9</sup> It is almost as though the Duke were afraid to be dull and must keep up a rapid succession of dazzling paradoxes and ever more violent shocks, which a less inwardly disturbed or compulsive rhetorician would be content to let lapse. One keeps sensing that the Duke is trying to evade the threat of personal catastrophe by building a fence and by constantly busying himself with doing something. According to Freud, "the actions performed in an obsessional condition are supported by a kind of energy that probably has no counterpart in normal mental life."<sup>10</sup> He makes a tyranny, not only within his own domestic life, but also within the theatrical domain of art. Like Browning himself in relation to the reader, the Duke calculates every gesture and action that will force his own will of aesthetic intention on the envoy.

Like most victims of obsessional neurosis, the Duke is occupied with such matters as the envoy's sitting and rising, which do not really interest him. Freud observes that such people "perform actions which . . . afford [them] no pleasure,"<sup>11</sup> like the Duke's account of his wife's attentions to Fra Pandolf, for example, which must have been painful to recall, but from which he is powerless to desist. The behavior of the neurotic may, according to Freud, be

"absolutely silly," as the Duke's revelations would seem to be in view of his negotiations for another wife. Though such apparent "silliness" has led critics like B. R. Jerman to call the speaker "witless," the Duke's character seems far closer to the personality of the obsessional neurotic as Freud describes him. He is "originally always a person of a very energetic disposition, often highly opinionated, and as a rule intellectually gifted above the average."<sup>12</sup> Laurence Perrine's excellent analysis of the Duke's shrewdness,<sup>13</sup> a valuable antidote to theories of his witlessness, emphasizes this aspect of his character. He is overconscientious, and more than usually correct in extending his courtesies to the envoy. In keeping with Freud's diagnosis the Duke's genius in controlling the responses of the envoy, and his skillful use of rhetoric, are evidence of superior intellect. But he devotes these powers to such ostensibly "silly" ends that, as Freud observes of the neurotic, "it is a sufficiently arduous task to find one's bearings in this maze of contradictory character-traits and morbid manifestations. . . . Only one thing is open to him . . . instead of one silly idea he can adopt another of a slightly milder character."<sup>14</sup> This is precisely what the Duke does at the end of the poem when he identifies himself with the lusty Neptune and sees the woman as the mule. He "can displace his sense of compulsion, but he cannot dispel it." He must repeat and correct the traumatic domestic situation that has given rise to his ceremonial compulsions.

These last hypotheses are admittedly speculative, but are not crucial to the main argument. For however hostile one may be to a Freudian analysis, which perhaps overemphasizes the sexual motivation, the Duke's rhetorical "seduction" of the envoy is certainly a grotesque form of social courtship, involving as it does communication between hierarchically related orders. Verbal "courtship" of an inferior embodies the hierarchical principle of which the Duke is so conscious, and it is a surrogate for the rhetoric of sexual courtship, much of whose "mystery" likewise proceeds from inequalities of social status. "The Bishop Orders His Tomb" offers a similar parody of courtship when the old ecclesiastic turns his death bed into a marriage bed, acting out in pantomime a kind of sexual seduction of his late mistress, but failing in his "courtship" of the heirs. But while the Bishop's failure is largely a result of the disparity between the two kinds of "courtship," the Duke's substitution of a verbal and dramatic mode of "seduction" provides him with a vicarious thrill. It is to

8. Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, trans. Joan Riviere (New York, 1960), pp. 268-83.

9. Langbaum, p. 84.

10. Freud, pp. 270-71.

11. Freud, p. 269.

12. Freud, p. 271.

13. Laurence Perrine, "Browning's Shrewd Duke," *PMLA* (1959), pp. 157-59.

14. Freud, p. 271.



that extent a "mystery," and inseparable from the psychosis of dominion and ownership that compels the Duke to treat the envoy, like his last Duchess, as another stage property.

If this argument is correct, then the Duke's spellbinding performance before his auditor enables him to glory in what Kenneth Burke has called "an aesthetic of crime which is infused, however perversely, with the 'mystery' of aristocracy."<sup>15</sup> He represents "aristocratic vice," crime that has the appeal of dramatic style. This is because Browning has cast the Duke as the outrageous producer of a social play that must bring into harmony with the prejudices of the speaker's own taste every spontaneous action of the Duchess. The Duke's theatrical sense, finely adjusted, as it seems, and revealing no more than a shadow of concern with the nominal purpose of his interview, results in the removal and elevation of the speaker, and in the willed isolation of his person. He is the compulsive producer who must reenact on a stage more flattering to his thwarted ego the drama of his past domestic life, and who, with all the craft of the spellbinder's art, deliberately sets out to control the responses of the envoy. I have tried to show how the Duke's treatment of his auditor is strikingly rhetorical, what Mr. Burke would call a "pantomimic" morality always on the alert for slight advantages. Even his

self-abasement before his visitor is a form of self-exaltation, "the first 'stratagem' of pride."

Thus to see Browning's Duke as a theatrical producer is not to suspend our moral judgement of him. For beneath the surface lies the deeper irony of the doom of Auden's "intellectuals without love." The last phrase, "for me," re-establishes the whole proprietary nature of the Duke, and rules out any possibility of a final redemption before he disappears forever by descending the staircase into what is at once a literary immortality and an insolently courted hell of personal damnation. Only an interpretation of this kind can account for the complex moral and aesthetic response that Browning's Duke arouses. The present reading does not pretend to change existing ideas about the poem, but to enrich them in a detailed way by linking a disciplined attention to rhetoric with the hypothesis that the Duke is staging a "show" that enables him to transform his domestic past into what he believes it should have been. The Duchess, of course, may be the victim and the envoy the stooge, but only the Duke, in his bland amorality, is duped. The craft of the producer, whose theatrical self fiercely wills the extinction of every other self, becomes a metaphor for the damnation of all self-deceived and ego-centric men.

Cornell University

## Wilkie Collins' *Heart and Science* and the Vivisection Controversy

Dougald B. MacEachen

IN NUMBER OF WORDS WRITTEN and amount of emotion generated, few Victorian controversies can compare with the one that arose over vivisection in the seventies and eighties. And like other problems that arose in the Victorian era, this one, although decided by law, was never settled to anyone's satisfaction. It was bequeathed to later generations and will not cease to be a problem so long as science continues to experiment with animals and there are men of feeling in the world.

The use of animals in physiological research was first brought to the attention of the general public in England in the sixties, but it was not until the mid-seventies that vivisection<sup>1</sup> began to be hotly debated in the British press and that thoughtful articles on the subject appeared in major periodicals. By 1875 the opponents of vivisection

were numerous and influential enough to have bills to control experimentation on animals introduced into Parliament and to have a commission appointed to investigate the practice.

Late in 1875 Frances Power Cobbe, an energetic and able crusader for various causes, founded the Society for Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection.<sup>2</sup> The efforts of Miss Cobbe and her supporters resulted in the passing of a law in 1876 by which experiments on live animals in Britain are regulated by the government. The publicity given to vivisection by these events in 1875 and 1876 was responsible for the appearance of a number of articles in the *Contemporary*, *Cornhill*, *Fortnightly*, *Macmillan's*, and the *Nineteenth Century* magazines in which the subject was debated at length and in depth. Another spate of articles

appeared in these periodicals in late 1881 and in 1882, stimulated by the introduction into Parliament of a bill to prohibit vivisection. After 1882 vivisection, so far as important English periodicals are concerned, was practically a dead issue, but of course not for its opponents, and the antivivisectionist societies carried on an unceasing warfare against it by means of advertisements in the press, posters, pamphlets with inflammatory illustrations taken from physiology laboratory manuals, lectures, public meetings, private appeals to influential individuals (Queen Victoria, Disraeli, Chief Justice Coleridge, Cardinal Manning, Edward Freeman, Benjamin Jowett, R. H. Hutton, Carlyle, Browning, Tennyson, Lewis Carroll, Christina Rossetti, Ruskin, Wilkie Collins, and G. B. Shaw supported the cause), and a magazine called *The Zoophilist*.

It was inevitable that once the practice of performing experiments on live animals became established as a common method of acquiring physiological and medical knowledge, opposition to it should have arisen. The right to freedom from pain was one of the basic assumptions of Victorian sensibility. On every hand strenuous efforts were being made by humanitarians and philanthropists to lessen the sum of human and animal suffering. The animal protection acts of 1822, 1835, and 1849 were major victories in the campaign to eliminate cruelty to animals. By mid-century humanitarians had reason to feel that they could rest on their laurels for a while and that domestic animals, at least, were well protected by British law from the wanton infliction of pain. The use of animals in science laboratories posed a brand-new threat, and humanitarians were understandably alarmed and angered. Scientific and humanitarian progress came into conflict. Here was a form of cruelty to animals that was not unlawful and that was likely to become more and more common as the field of medical studies was enlarged. Only legislation could limit or abolish it, and so humanitarians like Frances Power Cobbe and Lord Shaftesbury acted to get the necessary laws passed.

Since vivisection was protected by the formidable mass of learning and prestige represented by physical science, it was necessary for the antivivisectionists not only to "agitate the country," as Lord Shaftesbury put it, but also to advance convincing reasons to prove that scientists should not use animals as unrestrictedly as they used inert matter or that they should not use animals at all in the laboratory. They had to appeal to intellect as well as to emotion, and a large body of Victorian vivisection litera-

ture was the consequence. The case for and against vivisection was given its most distinguished presentation in lengthy periodical articles intended for intelligent readers. Taken together, these articles may be regarded as the classical statement on the question of vivisection. They explore almost every conceivable aspect of the subject.

The antivivisectionists were ingenious in finding arguments to use against the practice they hated passionately. Frances Power Cobbe and others maintained that man was not justified in using any means whatsoever to acquire knowledge no matter how useful. Man could not commit a crime in order to know. The deliberate infliction of pain on an animal was an evil. Therefore man was debarred from obtaining knowledge in this manner.<sup>3</sup> The end does not justify the means. The antivivisectionists sought to make vivisection a matter of conscience by making it a moral issue but were not too successful in establishing any universally acceptable moral basis for condemnation. It was easier to attempt to arouse the emotion of indignation than to persuade scientists and legislators that antivivisection had a divine sanction, as Ruskin, for instance, tried to do.<sup>4</sup>

A major argument was the alleged inutility of vivisection. The antivivisectionists did not hesitate to advance this argument in spite of the fact that most of them were neither scientists nor medical men and hence were not in the best position to know whether experiments on living animals advanced knowledge or not. They brought forward all the available facts to prove that the "balance of evidence is against the claim of vivisection to constitute a serious method of study for the cure and treatment of disease. . . ."<sup>5</sup> This argument was hardly likely to appeal to men possessed of the passion for scientific knowledge, but it could appeal to others.

Another commonly used argument against vivisection was that it deadened the moral sensibilities and made the vivisector indifferent to pain and cruelty: it had a damaging effect on the character. Lewis Carroll, for whom the real evil of vivisection was its supposed demoralizing effect on the individual, even raised the bogey of a vivisector who would cut up live human beings in the interest of science. He foresaw the advent of a day when "successive generations of students, trained from their earliest years to the repression of all human sympathies, shall have developed a new and more hideous Frankenstein—a soulless being to whom science shall be all in all."<sup>6</sup>

15. Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York, 1952), p. 145.

1. Neither the practice nor the word, meaning a surgical operation on a live animal for research purposes, are Victorian inventions. The first citation for *vivisection* in the O.E.D. is dated 1707.

Physiologists accepted the word, but some of them resented its use. They preferred "animal experiments."

2. Frances Power Cobbe described her part in the antivivisection movement in her autobiography, *Life of Frances Power Cobbe as Told by Herself* (London, 1904).

3. Frances Power Cobbe, "Mr. Lowe and the Vivisection Act," *Contemporary Review*, XXIX (1877), 344-45. George Bernard Shaw also uses this argument in *Doctors' Delusions*, *Crude Criminology*, and *Sham Education* (London, 1932).

4. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, eds. *The Works of John Ruskin*, XXXIV (London, 1906), 643-44.

5. Anna Kingsford, "The Uselessness of Vivisection," *Nineteenth Century Magazine*, XI (1882), 171.

6. Lewis Carroll, "Some Popular Fallacies about Vivisection," *Fortnightly Review*, XXIII (1875), 854.



An argument used by some antivivisectionists who accepted evolution was that since evolution had demonstrated the common origin of man and animals, vivisection was an abuse of man's "power over the animals whose chief man has gradually risen to be—a power which is limited both by our own moral nature and by the kindred nature of these animals."<sup>7</sup> Thomas Hardy as late as 1909 stated the evolutionist antivivisection position in its most extreme form to an inquirer:

The discovery of the law of evolution, which revealed that all organic creatures are of one family, shifted the center of altruism from humanity to the whole conscious world collectively. Therefore the practice of vivisection, which might have been defended while the belief ruled that men and animals are essentially different, has been left by that discovery without any logical argument in its favor. And if the practice, to the extent merely of inflicting slight discomfort now and then, be defended (as I sometimes hold it may) on grounds of it being good policy for animals as well as men, it is nevertheless in strictness a wrong, and stands precisely in the same category as would stand its practice on men themselves.<sup>8</sup>

The defenders of animal experiments had to meet the arguments of their opponents by whatever means they could, and, in general, their expositions of the practice were temperate and well considered. They had little choice of strategy; they were forced to answer attacks. They defended vivisection on the grounds of necessity and utility; they showed that hundreds of lives had been saved and human and animal suffering relieved by methods developed by experiments on laboratory animals. They denied that vivisection debased the vivisector any more than surgery debased the surgeon.<sup>9</sup> They asked why they were singled out for reprobation whereas those who inflicted pain in needless hunting were allowed to go scot-free.<sup>10</sup> They were engaged in the pursuit of scientific truth, "the highest and most civilising and most compassionate work in which a man can engage."<sup>11</sup> If at a small expense of pain it will give man knowledge to "prevent or mitigate

pain much more severe and lasting—or even to ward off peril to life, or to prolong life—in a human being, surely vivisection is more than justifiable."<sup>12</sup> They denied that vivisection, when carried on in such a way as to keep suffering to a minimum, was in any way immoral or irreligious.

It was against this background of attack and defense that Wilkie Collins' *Heart and Science* made its appearance. *Heart and Science* is especially noteworthy as a work of fiction<sup>13</sup> devoted to the cause of antivivisection by an outstanding novelist. Collins entered the controversy in its second phase, when efforts were being made to outlaw vivisection altogether. *Heart and Science* was serialized in *Belgravia* in 1882 and was published as a three-decker novel in 1883. Collins had passed his peak by this time, but he could still truthfully say that in *Heart and Science* "I am writing to a very large public both at home and abroad. . . ."<sup>14</sup> and could feel assured that his attack would have some effect. In this quite readable propaganda novel, an attack on science in general and on vivisection in particular, Collins, who had consistently incorporated attacks on cruelty to animals in his fiction, created the character of Dr. Benjulia<sup>15</sup> to show what might happen to a scientist who persisted in vivisectioning.

Collins was aided by Frances Power Cobbe to the extent that she sent him a supply of antivivisectionist literature, which he gratefully acknowledged. In the letter thanking Miss Cobbe, Collins stated his intentions with regard to Dr. Benjulia. He would trace the moral influence of laboratory cruelties "on the nature of the man who practices them, and the result as to his social relations with the persons about him. . . ." He would not make Benjulia an infinitely cruel and wicked man but would show "the efforts made by his better instincts to resist the inevitable hardening of the heart, the fatal stupefying of all the finer sensibilities, produced by the deliberately merciless occupations of his life."<sup>16</sup> It is in his relations with the child Zoe especially that Dr. Benjulia shows that he is not completely brutalized.

Benjulia is a tall, absurdly thin man with a gloomy, brooding stare who is either indifferent or politely cold to others. He is a recluse said to be conducting chemical experiments. Once a prominent nerve and brain specialist,

he now lives in an ugly isolated house in a suburb and has no medical practice. Nobody knows just what goes on in his laboratory, for he does not encourage visitors. Not until Chapter XXXI does the reader learn that Benjulia is a vivisectionist. Up to that point the doctor's activities have been enveloped in a haze of mystery. In XXXI Collins argues through Benjulia's brother Lemuel that if the law protects man from vivisection, it ought to protect animals also since both man and animal share the same physical nature. Lemuel also offers evidence to prove the uselessness of vivisection as a source of medical discoveries. Dr. Benjulia's answer to his brother's arguments is to make a shocking confession:

Am I working myself into my grave, in the medical interests of humanity? *That* for humanity! I am working for my own satisfaction—for my own pride—for my own unutterable pleasure in beating other men—for the fame that will keep my name living hundreds of years for its own sake, is the one god I worship. Knowledge is its own justification and its own reward. The roaring mob follows us with its cry of Cruelty. We pity their ignorance. Knowledge sanctifies cruelty. The old anatomist stole dead bodies for knowledge. In that sacred cause, if I could steal a living man without being found out, I would tie him on my table, and grasp my grand discovery in days, instead of months. . . .<sup>17</sup>

Collins gives the final touches to his portrait of the vivisectionist in the next to last chapter in the novel. But before that point in Benjulia's story is reached, Dr. Ovid Vere, who serves as a foil to Dr. Benjulia and who is the ideal doctor, arrives from Canada with a manuscript work on brain disease that will prove research by vivisection to be useless.

From this manuscript, which he had acquired from a dying doctor, Dr. Vere learns a new method for treating brain disease. He applies it to his cousin and fiancée, Carmina Graywell, who has had a nervous breakdown in his absence. Her incompetent physician, Dr. Null, has been giving her the wrong treatment, encouraged by Dr. Benjulia, who, although he knew the treatment to be wrong, had allowed it to continue because he wanted to observe the progress of the case for his own purposes. The conclusions to be drawn from his observations are more important to him than the recovery of a sick human being. To this doctor perverted by vivisection and greed for scientific knowledge Carmina is only a subject of experiment.

When Dr. Vere discovers what has been going on, he confronts Benjulia, calls him a villain, and threatens him

with death should Carmina die. It is not necessary for him to carry out his threat, however, for the method of treating brain disease developed by the Canadian doctor through non-vivisectional research and experience works a complete cure.

In almost all of Collins' stories the good characters are rewarded in this world for their virtues and the evil characters are punished for their vices. With Collins the punishment of the villain is usually highly melodramatic. There is only one end possible for a physician like Benjulia who has grown so callous to suffering while cutting up living animals that he has become indifferent to the suffering of human beings—a violent death. This Collins provides in Chapter LXII of *Heart and Science*.

Benjulia, motivated solely by desire for personal glory in his pursuit of knowledge, is haunted by a fear that someone will anticipate the discoveries he hopes to make. He subscribes to all the medical journals to check on the work of possible rivals. One evening, while paging through his periodicals, he finds a review of a book. The book is, of course, the work that Ovid Vere had brought back from Canada in manuscript. Benjulia drives to London for a copy of the book, reads it through, and finds that his work has been nullified. The next day he returns to his house, calls his servants together, and has them witness his will. His little friend Zoe is the sole legatee. This done, Benjulia locks himself in his laboratory, takes poison, and sets fire to his workshop. Collins finishes the story of his science villain in a few words: "The hideous remains of what had once been Benjulia, found Christian burial. His brethren of the torture-table attended the funeral in large numbers. Vivisection had been beaten on its own field of discovery. They honored the martyr who had fallen in their cause."<sup>18</sup>

Wilkie Collins' Dr. Benjulia is, of course, merely a melodramatic monster, a kind of scientific bogeyman, the vivisector burned in effigy. It is impossible to tell just what effect *Heart and Science* had on its readers. It may have made converts to the antivivisectionist cause, and it must surely have strengthened the opposition of those who already disapproved of experiments on animals as a method of research. One reviewer of the novel thought it would help "in the noble crusade against scientific cruelty."<sup>19</sup> It did not, however, arouse public feeling to the extent of bringing about the abolition by law of vivisection in Britain, which was what Collins no doubt aimed at. He may even have hoped that by putting the arguments against experiments on living animals in a concrete form in *Heart and Science* the novel would become the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of vivisection.

John Carroll University

7. Richard Congreve and J. H. Bridges, "Vivisection," *Fortnightly Review*, XXIII (1875), 436.  
8. Letter of Thomas Hardy to a correspondent in New York, in Florence Emily Hardy, *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy (1892-1928)* (New York, 1930), pp. 138-39.  
9. W. Stanley Jevons, "Cruelty to Animals—A Study in Sociology," *Fortnightly Review*, XXV (1876), 681.  
10. Jevons, 675.  
11. Jevons, 684.  
12. Sir Thomas Watson, "Vivisection," *Contemporary Review*, XXV (1875), 867.  
13. Among other works of literary art that are concerned with vivi-

section are Browning's "Tray" and "Arcades Ambo," John Davidson's lengthy "The Testament of a Vivisector," and Shaw's *The Philanderer*.  
14. Letter of Wilkie Collins to Frances Power Cobbe, in Cobbe, *Life*, p. 558.  
15. Collins probably chose the name Benjulia to suggest that vivisection was a diabolical importation and that no true-born Englishman should have anything to do with it. Antivivisectionist literature associated vivisection with the Continent. See, for instance, Lord Coleridge, "The Nineteenth Century Defenders of Vivisection," *Fortnightly Review*, XXXVIII (1882), 224-36.  
16. Letter in Cobbe, *Life*, pp. 558-59.

17. Wilkie Collins, *Heart and Science* (London, 1883), II, 156-59.  
18. Collins, III, 292.

19. "Heart and Science," *British Quarterly Review*, LXXVIII (1883), 232.



## Jude the Obscure as Pagan Self-Assertion

Ward Hellstrom

I CANNOT AGREE with Robert F. Fleissner that *Jude the Obscure* "is decidedly a pro-Christian document" or that the novel in any way implies "that, whether or not the Saints will intercede, they surely CAN."<sup>1</sup> One need not accept Norman Holland's view<sup>2</sup> that Father Time is a Christ figure and that through him Hardy symbolically indicts Christianity (though Holland's supporting evidence is hard to dispute) in order to document the novel's anti-Christian bias.

The anti-Christian bias of the novel owes much to Hardy's reading of *On Liberty*, which he tells us that he knew, as a young man, "almost by heart."<sup>3</sup> Sue quotes Mill: "who lets the world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation,"<sup>4</sup> and later paraphrases Mill's quotation from Humboldt: "To produce 'Human development in its richest diversity' (to quote your Humboldt) is to my mind far above respectability" (p. 270). Two other passages in *On Liberty* are underscored in Hardy's copy<sup>5</sup> and may be used as commentary on the above passages:

Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said) "thou shalt not" predominates unduly over "thou shalt." In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised into one of legality. (Chapter II).

and

"Pagan self-assertion" is one of the elements of human worth, as well as "Christian self-denial." There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox. (Chapter III).

Hardy apparently saw "Human development in its rich-

est diversity" a Pagan as distinctly opposed to a Christian assertion, and comments on the contrast: "Of course the book is all contrasts . . . e.g. Sue and her heathen gods set against Jude's reading the Greek Testament; Christminster academical, Christminster in the slums; Jude the saint, Jude the sinner; Sue the Pagan, Sue the saint; marriage, no marriage; &c., &c."<sup>6</sup>

That Sue is a Pagan who becomes a Christian is obvious; the reasons for this apparent transformation and the attitude toward Christianity which they imply are perhaps not so obvious. Sue's acceptance of Christianity is not only prepared for, but is inevitable. Hardy proleptically suggests this acceptance when Sue is first introduced into the novel: Jude sees her in her ecclesiastical workshop lettering "Alleluia" on a scroll (p. 103). The second time he sees her she is in church, and the first time we see her alone, though she purchases Pagan divinities—Venus and Apollo—she is embarrassed by their nakedness and subsequently informs Miss Fontover that they are statues of St. Peter and St. Mary Magdalen. In so doing she is symbolically denying the Pagan for the Christian, denying self-assertion and accepting self-denial.<sup>7</sup>

More importantly, Christianity satisfies Sue's psychological need: Sue is a masochist, as are many Hardy heroines; she causes injury so that she can suffer for the misery it produces. There are many examples of this in the novel, but perhaps two early ones will suffice: Sue asks Jude to give her away in marriage to Phillotson; Jude questions whether "Sue [is] simply so perverse that she wilfully gave herself and him pain for the odd and mournful luxury of practising long-suffering in her own person. . . ." (p. 209). Later after allowing Jude to kiss her, Sue has feelings of remorse and determines not to "write to him any more, or at least for a long time. . . . And I hope it will hurt him very much—expecting a letter to-morrow morning, and the next, and the next, and no letter coming. He'll suffer then with suspense—won't he, that's all!—and I am very glad of it!"—Tears of pity for Jude's approaching sufferings at her hands mingled with those which had surged up in pity of herself" (p. 263). Sue's masochism is the outlet for her obviously sublimated sexuality. What better place for Sue than a Church which "in its horror of sensuality, [had] made an idol of asceti-

cism"?<sup>8</sup> The irony of course is that Hardy sees the Church as repressing normal sexuality in order to satisfy the consequent perversion. Hardy's awareness of the sexual motivation of Sue's "conversion" is obvious in Jude's remark that it is "fanatic prostitution" (p. 436).

Jude's transformation from Christian to Pagan is perhaps not so obvious, but it is no less real. Though Jude appears as a Christian early in the novel, his "conversion" to Paganism is foreshadowed: he kneels to the Pagan divinities and repeats the hymn beginning, "Phoebe silvarumque potens Diana!"; Hardy then comments that "his curious superstition" may be "innate" (p. 36). Later, when Jude sees Sue in church and assumes that she is "probably a frequenter of this place, and, steeped body and soul in church sentiment as she must be by occupation and habit, had, no doubt, much in common with him," Hardy comments, "Though he was loth to suspect it, some people might have said to him that the atmosphere [of ecstasy which he felt] blew as distinctly from Cyprus as from Galilee" (p. 107). Hardy seems to be suggesting that it is the Hellenic element of the church that appeals to Jude rather than the Christian, that Jude is at heart a Pagan.

The structure of the novel involves the exchange of positions between Jude and Sue. As we have seen, this exchange is the result of a revelation rather than a transformation of character, but it does occur. Even before the death of the children, Jude realized that "he was mentally approaching the position which Sue had occupied when he first met her" (p. 373). After the death of the children and Sue's hysterical "conversion," the allusions to the reversal are many.<sup>9</sup> Jude ultimately finds it strange "that time and circumstance, which enlarge the views of most

men, narrow the views of women almost invariably" (p. 484), and in so finding he echoes Mill's views about Christianity, which Mill calls "a narrow theory of life" (*On Liberty*, Chapter III).

The novel's rejection of Christianity is suggested in a hundred ways<sup>10</sup> but is perhaps most explicit in Jude's rejection of Sue. He tells her, "Sue, Sue, you are not worth a man's love!" (p. 470) and later does not wish to see her again (p. 483). It is what Sue represents, what she has revealed herself to be, that Jude rejects; he rejects Christian self-denial, which he sees as hysterical, fanatic, perverse, in favor of Pagan self-assertion. Of course Jude commits suicide, and it may be argued that suicide is hysterical, fanatic, perverse, but such an argument is a conventional Christian one. Jude's death as a form of self-assertion, as a form of affirmation, can perhaps best be illustrated by a quotation from Kierkegaard: in the words of Judge William in *Either/Or*, "to despair truly one must truly will it, but when one truly wills it one is truly beyond despair; when one has willed despair one has truly chosen that which despair chooses, i.e., oneself in one's eternal validity,"<sup>11</sup> and Kierkegaard specifically associates this type of despair with Pagan Stoicism.<sup>12</sup> Surely Jude despairs, but his despair is a defiant one and he has freely chosen it. Jude's stoic self-assertion is then opposed to Sue's pathetic self-denial; it is positive as opposed to her negative; active as opposed to her passive; Pagan as opposed to her Christian. Jude's death is an affirmation of his individuality as his whole life had been; it is a Stoical assertion of the self that Christianity would deny. The novel is neither nihilistic nor, I think, pessimistic; but it is certainly anti-Christian.

University of Florida

## Trabb's Boy and Orlick

Barry D. Bort

TWO RECENT CRITICS of *Great Expectations* have seen Orlick as a character who bears a peculiar relationship to Pip, the hero of the novel. Julian Moynahan (*Essays in Criticism*, X [January 1960], 60-79) sees Orlick as a "monstrous caricature of the tender-minded hero, insisting that they are two of a kind with the same ends, pursued through similarly predatory and criminal means." And

Harry Stone (*Kenyon Review*, XIV [Autumn 1962], 662-91) says "Orlick is both an objectified fragment of Pip's self, a projection of Pip's darker desires and aggressions, and a manifestation of primal evil."

There is another character in the novel who also exists as a reflection of at least a portion of Pip's character, Trabb's boy. Lacking a name, this young man is present

1. "The Name Jude," *Victorian Newsletter*, No. 27 (Spring 1965), pp. 24-26.

2. "Jude the Obscure: Hardy's Symbolic Indictment of Christianity," *NCF*, IX (June 1954), 50-60.

3. *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy* (New York, 1930), pp. 118-19. Several critics have seen the influence of Mill on the novel, e.g. William R. Rutland, *Thomas Hardy* (Oxford, 1938) and Evelyn Hardy, *Thomas Hardy* (New York, 1955).

4. P. 269. All citations to *Jude* in the text are to the Harper's Classic edition.

5. See Evelyn Hardy, p. 162n.

6. *The Later Years*, p. 42.

7. Toward the end of the novel, after Sue's "conversion," Jude asks her, "Where are dear Apollo, and dear Venus now!" (p. 424). The answer of course is that they have become St. Peter and St. Mary Magdalen.

8. Jude sees the masochistic nature of Sue's "conversion" when he asks whether she is not "indulging in the luxury of the emotion raised by an affected belief" (p. 470).

9. E.g., pp. 415, 418, 419, 423, 424, 474.

10. To suggest only a few random examples: there is in Physician Vilbert, the physician who gets his remedies from Mount Sinai, whose center is Christminster, and who deals in love potions, a parody of Christ; Sue's second marriage to Phillotson and Jude's second marriage to Arabella are endorsed with enthusiasm by a vicar (p. 439) and a parson (p. 463), respectively; St. John's vision

of the City of God is described as that of a diamond merchant (p. 20); and finally Sue's quoting of St. Paul, "Charity seeketh not her own" and Jude's answering, "In that chapter we are one" (p. 437), is unequivocally and terribly ironic as her whole "conversion" is selfishly motivated.

11. Quoted in William G. McCollom, *Tragedy* (New York, 1957), p. 220.

12. In *Sickness Unto Death in A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. Robert Bretall (Princeton, 1946), p. 366.



in the novel at three significant moments in Pip's career. When Pip first prepares to leave for London, having been informed of his "expectations," he goes to Mr. Trabb for a suitable outfit. The clothier fawns on him while the boy employed as a helper in Trabb's shop ignores Pip and, while sweeping, unconcernedly sweeps over Pip too. Trabb is as demanding with the boy—his treatment is reminiscent of the harsh way Pip was handled by his sister—as he is obsequious to Pip. The only distinction between the two boys is that one has come into money. Trabb's boy appears a second time when Pip returns from London in the midst of his education as a gentleman. Pip has planned a grand entry but suddenly he is confronted by Trabb's boy who humiliates him. First he affects fear of this elegant personage from London; then he imitates Pip as he once was. "He was coming round a narrow corner. His blue bag was slung over his shoulder, honest industry beamed in his eyes . . ." And finally he imitates Pip in his newly acquired grandeur.

"This time he was entirely changed. He wore the blue bag in the manner of my great-coat, and was strutting along the pavement toward me on the opposite side of the street, attended by a company of delighted young friends to whom from time to time he exclaimed, with a wave of his hand, 'Don't know yah! . . .'"

"This disgrace attendant on his immediately afterwards taking to crowing and pursuing me across the bridge with crows, as from an exceedingly dejected fowl who had known me when I

was a blacksmith, culminated the disgrace with which I left the town, and was, so to speak, ejected by it into open country." (Chapter 30)

As Orlick lays bare the possibility of evil in Pip, so Trabb's boy deflates his pretensions to gentility and reveals to all watching his inescapable connection with the life he would like to forget. But Trabb's boy would be no more than an amusing ornamentation were it not for his final appearance in the novel. Pip, for the first time aware of his self-deception and ashamed of his treatment of Joe, returns to the town and is captured by Orlick. Rescued at the last moment by Herbert Pocket and Startop, the unconscious Pip sees first of all the face of Trabb's boy who had directed Pip's rescuers to the place on the marshes where Orlick had planned to kill him. So Pip, in a sense, owes his life to the boy who had mocked him. But not because the latter had any affection for him: he "would have been much affected by disappointment, if he had known that his intervention saved me from the limekiln. Not that Trabb's boy was of a malignant nature, but that he had too much spare vivacity. . . ." "When we parted, I presented him with two guineas (which seemed to meet his views) and I told him that I was sorry ever to have had an ill opinion of him (which made no impression on him at all)." (Chapter 53)

If Orlick mirrors the capacity for evil in Pip, then it is surely noteworthy that the hero's salvation is accomplished by the character who represents the mocking, unreflective world of boyhood.

Central Michigan University

## Recent Publications: A Selected List

Arthur F. Minerof

September 1965—February 1966

I

### GENERAL

- ARTS. Edwards, Tudor. "Sir Joseph Paxton: The Versatile Gardener." *History Today*, December, pp. 855-64. Paxton was an imaginative architect and landscape-gardener.
- BIBLIOGRAPHY. Gordan, John D. "An Anniversary Exhibition: The Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection 1940-1965." *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, October and November, pp. 537-54 and 597-608. Notes on various selections made for the exhibition, including works by the Brownings, Tennyson, Thackeray, Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, Carroll, Swinburne, Hardy, Stevenson.
- Paden, W. D. "Tennyson's *The Lover's Tale*, R. H. Shepherd, and T. J. Wise." *Studies in Bibliography: Papers of the Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 111-45. Disputes Wise's statement that Shepherd had printed six pirated editions.
- CRITICISM AND LITERARY HISTORY. Birkenhead, Sheila. *Illustrious Friends*. Hamish Hamilton. Joseph and Arthur

Severn and their relationships with English writers, including Ruskin. Rev. *TLS*, 30 December, p. 1211.

Fredeman, William E. *Pre-Raphaelitism*. Harvard. Catalog of Pre-Raphaelite pictures, books, and articles. Rev. *TLS*, 23 September, p. 836.

Graham, Kenneth. *English Criticism of the Novel, 1865-1900*. Oxford. The demands on the novel could amount to almost anything. Rev. *TLS*, 3 February, p. 82.

Griest, Guinevere L. "A Victorian Leviathan: Mudie's Select Library." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, September, pp. 103-26. The growth of Victorian circulating libraries and the part played in their dissolution by the extinction of the three-volume novel.

Marcus, Steven. "Pisanus Fraxi, Pornographer Royal." *Partisan Review*, Winter, pp. 13-32, 99-113. Examines the three-volume bibliography of pornographic or sexual writings compiled by Pisanus Fraxi, pseudonym of Henry Spencer Ashbee.

Palmer, D. J. *The Rise of English Studies*. Oxford. The study

of English language and literature from its beginnings to the founding of the Oxford English school in 1894. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 22.

Scheider, R. M. "Loss and Gain? The Theme of Conversion in Late Victorian Fiction." *Victorian Studies*, September, pp. 29-44. The reasons for the "loss" and the nature of the "gain" in several writers, including Mrs. Ward and William White.

Welsh, Alexander. "The Allegory of Truth in English Fiction." *Victorian Studies*, September, pp. 7-28. Examines the use of truth (synonymous with loyalty, restraint, propriety) in novels by Thackeray, Trollope, Scott, and Dickens.

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. Altick, Richard D. "'Our Gallant Colonel' in *Punch* and Parliament." *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, September, pp. 424-45. Colonel Sibthorp's "last-ditch Toryism" provides the outlines of the conflict between the conservative past and the liberal present as seen by the early Victorian mind.

Arnstein, Walter L. *The Bradlaugh Case*. Oxford. A study in late Victorian opinion and politics. Rev. *TLS*, 11 November, p. 999.

Chilston, Viscount. *W. H. Smith*. Routledge. Smith played an important part in Conservative governments from 1874 until his death in 1891.

Crook, David Paul. *American Democracy in English Politics, 1815-1850*. Oxford. Rev. *TLS*, 20 January, p. 46.

Dunbabin, J. P. D. "Expectations of the New County Councils, and Their Realization." *Historical Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp. 353-77. The establishment of the Councils had a conservative influence on local governments.

Fetter, Frank Whitson. *Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy, 1797-1875*. Harvard. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 28.

Fisher, Walter R. "John Bright: 'Hawker of Holy Things.'" *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, April, 1965, pp. 157-63. Bright was one of the few statesmen who had the courage, moral conviction, and rhetorical skill to challenge a popular (Crimean) war.

Hurst, Michael. "Ireland and the Ballot Act of 1872." *Historical Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp. 326-52. Disputes the idea that the Act revolutionized Irish politics.

Letwin, Shirley Robin. *The Pursuit of Certainty*. Cambridge. Development of aspects of British political thought; includes material on Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Rev. *TLS*, 18 November, pp. 1013-15.

Macintyre, Angus. *The Liberator*. Hamish Hamilton. Daniel O'Connell and the Irish Party, 1830-1847. Rev. *TLS*, 7 October, p. 901.

Mansergh, Nicholas. *The Irish Question, 1840-1921*. Allen and Unwin. Rev. *TLS*, 11 November, p. 999.

Millman, Richard. *British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War*. Oxford. Rev. *TLS*, 6 January, p. 11.

Nowlan, Kevin B. *The Politics of Repeal*. Routledge. The relations between Great Britain and Ireland, 1841-1850. Rev. *TLS*, 11 November, p. 999.

Sanderson, G. N. *England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882-1899*. Edinburgh. British imperial policy on the Nile. Rev. *TLS*, 3 February, p. 75.

Ward, T. J. "Young England." *History Today*, February, pp. 120-27. Romantic views of the Middle Ages and a dislike for the negative effects of industrialism inspired a group of young Conservatives in the House of Commons during the 1840's.

Wilson, Charles. "Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britain." *Economic History Review*, August, pp. 183-98. The "Great Depression" years were ones not only of crisis but also of new growth.

Whyte, J. H. "Landlord Influence at Elections in Ireland, 1760-1885." *English Historical Review*, October, pp. 740-60. Traces the rise of this influence, and its decline and collapse in the 1870's.

Winter, James. "The Cave of Adullam and Parliamentary Reform." *English Historical Review*, January, pp. 38-55.

The Cave, a band of liberals who helped defeat Russell's last attempt to widen the franchise, later aided Disraeli in piloting the Reform Bill of 1867 through parliament.

HISTORY. Bartlett, Norman. *The Gold Seekers*. Jarrolds. The Australian gold rush in the 1850's. Rev. *TLS*, 6 January, p. 13.

Deacon, Richard. *The Private Life of Mr. Gladstone*. Frederick Muller. Rev. *TLS*, 25 November, p. 1040.

Hibbert, Christopher. "Garibaldi in England, 1864." *History Today*, September, pp. 595-604. Garibaldi's visit and English reaction.

Holdsworth, Sir William. *A History of English Law*. Vol. XV. Eds. A. L. Goodhart and H. G. Hanbury. Methuen. Covers the period 1832 to 1875. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 27.

Lewis, Michael. *The Navy in Transition, 1814-1864*. Hodder and Stoughton. Rev. *TLS*, 24 February, p. 134.

MacLeod, Roy M. "The Alkali Acts Administration, 1863-84: The Emergence of the Civil Scientist." *Victorian Studies*, December, pp. 85-112. The Administration represents one of the most fruitful examples of Victorian social policy.

Naidis, Mark. "Sir Richard Temple: Literary Proconsul." *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Winter, pp. 82-94. Temple's literary talent aided his meteoric rise in the Indian Civil Service.

Symons, Julian. *England's Pride*. Hamish Hamilton. The Gordon relief expedition, 1884-1885. Rev. *TLS*, 18 November, p. 1019.

Thurston, Gavin. *The Great Thames Disaster*. Allen and Unwin. Account of the sinking of the pleasure-steamer Princess Alice in 1878, giving glimpses of a bygone London. Rev. *TLS*, 14 October, p. 917.

RELIGION. Anderson, Olive. "The reactions of Church and Dissent towards the Crimean War." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, October, pp. 209-20. The Crimean War prompted the clergy to express varied conceptions of war.

Dell, Robert S. "Social and Economic Theories and Pastoral Concerns of a Victorian Archbishop." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, October, pp. 196-208. The many concerns of a talented cleric.

Marsh, Peter T. "The Primate and the Prime Minister: Archbishop Tait, Gladstone, and the National Church." *Victorian Studies*, December, pp. 113-40. The conflict



- between Tait and Gladstone over legislation to reform the administration and worship of the Church.
- Powell, H. Gordon. "Ecce Homo: The Historical Jesus in 1865." *London Quarterly and Holborn Review*, January, pp. 52-56. The book's innocence of mid-twentieth-century theological attitudes limits our ability to share its thesis.
- Shaw, Thomas. *The Bible Christians, 1815-1907*. Epworth. A study of the denomination. Rev. *TLS*, 14 October, p. 924.
- Wright, C. J. "One of Many: Bishop Jeune of Peterborough, Anglo-French Oxford Reformer." *London Quarterly and Holborn Review*, January, pp. 57-63. An examination of his thought and work in light of modern ideas.
- SOCIAL. Chadwick, Edwin. *The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain*, ed. M. W. Flinn. Edinburgh. An 1842 report on the unsanitary conditions among the urban poor. Rev. *TLS*, 6 January, p. 12.
- Crook, J. Mordaunt. "Sir Robert Peel: Patron of the Arts." *History Today*, January, pp. 3-11. Peel was a representative figure in the fashionable art world of his day.
- Huttenback, Robert A. "G. A. Henty and the Imperial Stereotype." *Huntington Library Quarterly*, November, pp. 63-77. Henty's books for the young, in which he drew a bright imperial image, helped color the attitudes of generations of British schoolboys.
- Huxley, Gervas. *Lady Elizabeth and the Grosvenors*. Oxford. Life in a Whig family, 1822-1839. Rev. *TLS*, 4 November, p. 978.
- Middleton, Dorothy. *Victorian Lady Travellers*. Dutton.
- Naylor, Leonard E. *The Irrepressible Victorian*. Macdonald. Biography of Thomas Gibson Bowles, founder and proprietor of *Vanity Fair*. Rev. *TLS*, 2 December, p. 1100.
- Russell, Rex C. *A History of Schools and Education in Lindsey, Lincolnshire, 1800-1902*. Part One. Lindsey County Council Education Committee. Rev. *TLS*, 6 December, p. 1185.
- Shepherd, John A. *Spencer Wells*. E. and S. Livingstone. The life and work of a Victorian surgeon. Rev. *TLS*, 23 September, p. 822.
- II
- INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS
- ARNOLD. Brooks, Roger L. "Letters of Matthew Arnold: A Supplementary Checklist." *Studies in Philology*, January, pp. 93-98. Reviews the history of attempts to publish Arnold's letters; includes list of additional letters.
- Carrithers, Gale H., Jr. "Missing Persons on Dover Beach?" *Modern Language Quarterly*, June, pp. 264-66. Uncertainty as to the nature of the speaker and the lady weakens the poem.
- Greenberg, Robert A. "Patterns of Imagery: Arnold's 'Shakespeare.'" *Studies in English Literature*, Autumn, pp. 723-33. A study of Arnold's imagery, as exemplified in the sonnet.
- BAGEHOT. St. John-Stevas, Norman, ed. *The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot: Vols. I-II, The Literary Essays*. The Economist. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 24.
- BRONTËS. Fraser, John. "The Name of Action: Nelly Dean and *Wuthering Heights*." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, December, pp. 223-36. Defends Nelly's conduct; sees her as acting resolutely against evil for the sake of others.
- Momberger, Philip. "Self and World in the Works of Charlotte Brontë." *ELH*, September, pp. 349-69. The Brontë hero is an outcast seeking self-realization through interaction with the opposing world.
- Moser, Lawrence E. "From Portrait to Person: A Note on the Surrealistic in *Jane Eyre*." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, December, pp. 275-81. Jane's three "quasi-surrealistic" paintings mirror her own and her author's experiences.
- Pearsall, Robert Brainard. "The Presiding Tropes of Emily Brontë." *College English*, January, pp. 267-73. Considers the "energy and boldness" of the figurative language in *Wuthering Heights*.
- BROWNING. Day, Robert A. "Browning's Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister, 17-24." *Explicator*, December, No. 33. The goblet and the lily of Brother Lawrence are focal points for the speaker's hatred.
- Jerman, B. R. "The Death of Robert Browning." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, October, pp. 47-74. The biographical details of the poet's last days.
- Miyoshi, Masao. "Mill and 'Pauline': The Myth and Some Facts." *Victorian Studies*, December, pp. 154-63. Disputes the "myth" that Mill's criticism of "Pauline" changed the course of Browning's poetic development.
- Perrine, Laurence. "Browning's *The Bishop Orders His Tomb at Saint Praxed's Church*." *Explicator*, October, No. 12. The Bishop's utterances from *Ecclesiastes* are in ironic contrast to his view of life.
- Stempel, Daniel. "Browning's *Sordello*: The Art of the Makers-See." *PMLA*, December, pp. 554-61. The poem is a dioramic narrative, a three-dimensional work that cannot be fitted into the "two-dimensional limits of ordinary narration."
- CLOUGH. Miyoshi, Masao. "Clough's Poems of Self-Irony." *Studies in English Literature*, Autumn, pp. 691-704. Although he seldom forgot his spiritual condition, Clough could also look at himself with a light-hearted irony.
- Veyriras, Paul. *Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-1861)*. Didier. Biographical and critical study. Rev. *TLS*, 2 December, p. 1104.
- DICKENS. Axton, William. "The Trouble with Esther." *Modern Language Quarterly*, December, pp. 545-57. Esther Summerson's personal inconsistencies represent an objective study of a character divided against herself.
- Axton, William. "Unity and Coherence in *The Pickwick Papers*." *Studies in English Literature*, Autumn, pp. 663-76. Point of view is the unifying force of the novel.
- Bell, Vereen M. "Mrs. General as Victorian England: Dickens' Image of his Times." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, September, pp. 177-84. Mrs. General represents the idle middle class, "the vacuum of sympathy that allows misery to exist."
- Blount, Trevor. "The Ironmaster and the New Acquisitiveness: Dickens' Views on the Rising Industrial Classes as Exemplified in *Bleak House*." *Essays in Criticism*, October, pp. 414-27. There are similarities as well as differences between the power of tradition (Sir Leicester) and that of the new industrial potential (The Ironmaster).
- Fradin, Joseph I. "Will and Society in *Bleak House*." *PMLA*, March, pp. 95-109. The importance of the conflict between self and society, between Esther's subjective vision and the meaningless third person world.
- Garis, Robert. *The Dickens Theatre*. Oxford. Dickens creates a world inhabited by vivid and full characters, and develops a vision of that world that gives meaning to his novels. Rev. *TLS*, 10 February, p. 104.
- Hill, A. G. "The Real World of Charles Dickens." *Critical Quarterly*, Winter, pp. 374-83. Dickens' real world is the nineteenth century, not that depicted by recent critics who view him in terms of symbolic patterns.
- Nelson, Harland S. "Dickens's *Our Mutual Friend* and Henry Mayhew's *London Labour and The London Poor*." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, December, pp. 207-22. Suggests that Betty Higden was modeled on an old woman in Mayhew's book.
- Ridland, J. M. "Huck, Pip, and Plot." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, December, pp. 286-90. Twain may have been indebted to *Great Expectations* for two important scenes in *Huckleberry Finn*.
- Ryan, J. S. *Charles Dickens and New Zealand*. Wellington, N. Z.: A. H. and A. W. Reed. Contributions relevant to New Zealand, mainly by Dickens. Rev. *TLS*, 7 October, p. 905.
- Stone, Harry. "The Novel as Fairy Tale: Dickens' *Dombey and Son*." *English Studies*, February, pp. 1-27. Dickens blends autobiography, psychology, symbolism, and "fairy-tale fancy."
- Wagenknecht, Edward. *Dickens and the Scandal mongers*. Oklahoma. Eleven pieces on the novelist. The main essay contends that Dickens and Ellen Ternan were not lovers. Rev. *TLS*, 27 January, p. 64.
- ELIOT. Adam, Ian. "Character and Destiny in George Eliot's Fiction." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, September, pp. 127-43. Eliot's belief in human responsibility is not incompatible with her belief in impersonal material causes for all events.
- Allen, Walter. *George Eliot*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. A biographical and critical study. Rev. *TLS*, 11 November, p. 996.
- Lerner, Laurence. "The Education of Gwendolen Harleth." *Critical Quarterly*, Winter, pp. 355-64. Gwendolen's conversion from egoism to more generous impulses under the influence of Deronda.
- Levine, George. "Intelligence as Deception: *The Mill on the Floss*." *PMLA*, September, pp. 402-9. The novel goes wrong because of Eliot's self-deceit, a "combination of high intelligence with a powerful moral revulsion from what that intelligence tended to reveal."
- Mansell, Darrel, Jr. "George Eliot's Conception of 'Form.'" *Studies in English Literature*, Autumn, pp. 651-62. Eliot's "Notes on Form in Art" make clear that the principle of analogy is a unifying force in her novels.
- Paris, Bernard J. *Experiments in Life*. Wayne State. Eliot's art in relation to her beliefs. Rev. *TLS*, 23 September, p. 828.
- GASKELL. Pollard, Arthur. *Mrs. Gaskell: Novelist and Biographer*. Manchester. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 26.
- Wright, Edgar. *Mrs. Gaskell*. Oxford. Critical study. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 26.
- GISSING. Coustillas, Pierre. "Henry Hick's Recollections of George Gissing." *Huntington Library Quarterly*, February, pp. 161-70. Previously unpublished notes about Gissing by his friend Hick.
- Coustillas, Pierre, ed. *The Letters of George Gissing to Gabrielle Fleury*. New York Public Library.
- HALLAM. Tennyson, Sir Charles and F. T. Baker. "Some Unpublished Poems by Arthur Hallam." *Victorian Poetry*, Summer, pp. 1-18.
- HARDY. Fernando, Lloyd. "Thomas Hardy's Rhetoric of Painting." *Review of English Literature*, October, pp. 62-73. Hardy's rhetoric was deeply influenced by European paintings.
- Fischer, C. M. *Life in Thomas Hardy's Dorchester, 1888-1908*. Toucan. Topographical historical guide. Also reprints recollections of Hardy by Fischer's father, who was the novelist's doctor. Rev. *TLS*, 30 September, p. 885.
- Hyde, William J. "Theoretic and Practical Unconventionality in *Jude the Obscure*." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, September, pp. 155-64. Four possible levels of existence in the novel and the relationship of two of them to Mill's thought.
- Morrell, Roy. *Thomas Hardy: The Will and the Way*. Oxford. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 21.
- Paterson, John. "The Latest Gossip: Thomas Hardy and the Toucan Press Monographs." *Victorian Studies*, September, pp. 45-49. These monographs, by people who knew Hardy, do give a revealing picture of the novelist, mainly in his old age.
- Sankey, Benjamin. "Henchard and Faust." *English Language Notes*, December, pp. 123-25. Hardy's portrayal of Henchard seems to owe much to Carlyle's account of Faust.
- Scott, James F. "Spectacle and Symbol in Thomas Hardy's Fiction." *Philological Quarterly*, October, pp. 527-44. Hardy's use of symbols drives from his ability "to refine and sophisticate gothic spectacle."
- Weber, Carl J. *Hardy of Wessex*. Routledge. Revised and expanded edition. Rev. *TLS*, 13 January, p. 21.
- HOPKINS. Chevigny, Bell Gale. "Instress and Devotion in the Poetry of Gerard Manly Hopkins." *Victorian Studies*, December, pp. 141-53. Instress represents the key to Hopkins' aesthetics and his spiritual growth.
- Driscoll, John P. "Hopkins' *Spring*, line 2, and *Spring and Fall: To a Young Child*, line 2." *Explicator*, November, No. 26. Offers clarifications for both lines.
- Giovannini, Margaret. "Hopkins' *God's Grandeur*." *Explicator*, December, No. 36. The scientific connotation of the word *grandeur* is the key to the poem's meaning.
- Pitts, Arthur W., Jr. "Hopkins' *The Wreck of the Deutschland*, Stanza 29." *Explicator*, No. 7. Suggests an interpretation of Hopkins' description of the nun as "Tarpeian-fast."
- Schneider, Elisabeth W. "The Wreck of the *Deutschland*: A New Reading." *PMLA*, March, pp. 110-22. The poem "is an ode on conversion—conversion to the Catholic Church."



- Thomas, Alfred. "A Hopkins Fragment Replaced." *TLS*, 20 January, p. 48. Pieces together two fragmentary letters of Hopkins.
- KIPLING. Cohen, Morton. *Rudyard Kipling to Rider Haggard*. Hutchinson. Includes 49 Kipling letters printed for the first time. Rev. *TLS*, 14 October, p. 916.
- Cohen, Morton N. "Rudyard Kipling to Andrew Lang: An Unpublished Letter in Verse." *Dalhousie Review*, Autumn, pp. 360-64. Verse parody.
- Cornell, Louis L. "The Authenticity of Rudyard Kipling's Uncollected Newspaper Writings: 1882-1888." *English Literature in Transition*, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 242-49. Present state of our information about these pieces; lists items in Stewart-Yeats *Catalogue* that Cornell disputes.
- Gilbert, Elliot L., ed. *Kipling and the Critics*. Peter Owen, Essays on Kipling from Oscar Wilde onward.
- Green, Roger Lancelyn. *Kipling and the Children*. Elek Books. Rev. *TLS*, 14 October, p. 916.
- Lauterbach, Edward S. "An Annotated Bibliography of Writings about Rudyard Kipling: First Supplement." *English Literature in Transition*; Vol. 8, No. 3 and Vol. 8, No. 4; pp. 136-202 and 203-41. Supplement to the three-part bibliography published in 1960 by ELT.
- MACAULAY. Griffin, John R. *The Intellectual Milieu of Lord Macaulay*. Ottawa.
- MEREDITH. Beer, Gillian. "The Amazing Marriage: a Study in Contraries." *Review of English Literature*, January, pp. 92-105. The novel is the author's attempt to reconcile artistically contradictory attractions that had plagued him throughout his career.
- Beer, Gillian. "Meredith's Idea of Comedy: 1876-1880." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, September, pp. 165-76. Meredith came to feel that the comic spirit ignored rich areas of human experience.
- MILL. Alexander, Edward. "Mill's Theory of Culture: The Wedding of Literature and Democracy." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, October, pp. 75-88. Mill's definition of poetry's moral function—its ability to arouse imaginative sympathy—is the bridge between his theory of literature and his concept of a democratic culture.
- Hall Roland. "Addenda to 'The Diction of John Stuart Mill.'" *Notes and Queries*, November, pp. 419-25. Additional items mainly from *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812-1848*, ed. Francis E. Mineka.
- Hamburger, Joseph. *Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the Philosophic Radicals*. Yale. The rise and decline of this group. Rev. *TLS*, 17 February, p. 120.
- Robson, J. M., ed. *Principles of Political Economy*. 2 Vols. Routledge. Rev. *TLS*, 2 December, pp. 1089-91.
- NEWMAN. Holmes, J. Derek. "Newman's Reputation and *The Lives of the English Saints*." *Catholic Historical Review*, January, pp. 528-38. Newman's part in the series.
- PATER. DeLaura, David J. "Pater and Eliot: The Origin of the 'Objective Correlative.'" *Modern Language Quarterly*, September, pp. 426-31. Pater foreshadowed some aspects of Eliot's thought.
- RUSKIN. Gleckner, Robert F. "Ruskin and Byron." *English Language Notes*, September, pp. 47-51. Ruskin's praise of Byron's *The Island* demonstrates the consistency of his aesthetic values and critical tenets.
- STEVENSON. Faurot, Ruth Marie. "From Records to Romance: Stevenson's *The Black Arrow* and *The Paston Letters*." *Studies in English Literature*, Autumn, pp. 677-90. Stevenson's use of the *Letters* as source material for his novel.
- Issler, Anne Roller. "Robert Louis Stevenson in Monterey." *Pacific Historical Journal*, August, pp. 305-21. Details of Stevenson's stay.
- SWINBURNE. Lang, Cecil Y. *New Writings by Swinburne*. Syracuse. Rev. *TLS*, 4 November, p. 980.
- SYMONS. Munro, John M. "Arthur Symons and W. B. Yeats: The Quest for Compromise." *Dalhousie Review*, Summer, pp. 137-52. Symons' quest for order was a failure; Yeats's, however, was successful.
- Stanford, Derek. "Arthur Symons as Literary Critic (1865-1945): A Centenary Assessment." *Queen's Quarterly*, Autumn, pp. 533-41. An appreciation.
- TENNYSON. Cadbury, William. "Tennyson's 'The Palace of Art' and the Rhetoric of Structures." *Criticism*, Winter, 1965, pp. 23-44. The poem is a unified presentation, similar in its form to *In Memoriam* and "The Two Voices."
- Hunt, John Dixon. "A Short Guide to Tennyson Studies." *Critical Survey*, Winter, pp. 163-68. Lists and evaluates important Tennyson criticism.
- Mays, J. C. C. "'In Memoriam': An Aspect of Form." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, October, pp. 22-46. To understand its form, we must turn to the attitudes toward form expressed in the poem itself.
- Melchiori, Giorgio. "Locksley Hall Revisited: Tennyson and Henry James." *Review of English Literature*, October, pp. 9-25. James's story *A Passionate Pilgrim* is based on "Locksley Hall."
- Ricks, Christopher. "Hallam's 'Youthful Letters' and Tennyson." *English Language Notes*, December, pp. 120-21. Even at the end of his life, the poet was sensitive to the memory of Arthur Hallam.
- Ricks, Christopher. "Tennyson: 'Armageddon' into 'Timbuctoo.'" *Modern Language Review*, January, pp. 23-24. One draft of 'Armageddon' shows that about half of it was incorporated almost verbatim into "Timbuctoo."
- THACKERAY. Wilkinson, Ann Y. "The Tomeavesian Way of Knowing the World: Technique and Meaning in *Vanity Fair*." *ELH*, September, pp. 370-77. Thackeray's technique of gossip presents a "reality" at once refracted and removed.
- THOMSON. Byron, Kenneth Hugh. *The Pessimism of James Thomson (B.V.) in Relation to His Times*. Mouton. Rev. *TLS*, 3 February, p. 81.
- TROLLOPE. Kenney, Blair G. "Trollope's Ideal Statesmen: Plantagenet Palliser and Lord John Russell." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, December, pp. 281-85. Palliser's portrait is based on the career and personality of Russell.
- WILDE. Wadleigh, Paul C. "Earnest at St. James's Theatre." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, February, pp. 58-62. Notes on the 1895 production of and critical reaction to Wilde's play.

Staten Island Community College

## English X News

### Committee News

- Officers for 1966 are J. Hillis Miller, Chairman; Robert Langbaum, Secretary. Wendell Stacy Johnson will serve as Chairman in 1967.
- The following nominations were approved at the 1965 meeting: Martin J. Svaglic, 1967 Secretary; Park Honan and R. H. Super, Advisory and Nominating Committee Members, 1967-1968; Robert Preyer, 1966 Program Chairman. The topic for the December program has been left open and all inquiries should be addressed to Mr. Preyer (Department of English, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts).

### Correspondence

- Writing from London, James G. Nelson (University of Wisconsin) suggests that VNL readers who may not as yet be aware of *The Aylesford Review* are likely to find its contents attractive. Recent numbers have considered the work of John Gray, Arthur Machen, and F. W. Rolfe.
- Eoin McKiernan (College of St. Thomas) writes of the birth of a new quarterly, *Eire-Ireland*, sponsored by the Irish-American Cultural Institute. Papers on "Irish-related" materials are invited and should be sent to the Editors (College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota).
- Mrs. E. Anne Kilcullen (105 Isabella Street, Toronto) comments: "In an article in *The Victorian Newsletter*, Number 27 (Spring 1965), entitled 'A Note to Hegel and George Eliot' (pp. 13-15), Darrel Mansell, Jr., writes:

She [Dinah Morris] tells her audience, 'you must think of me as a saint.'

The passage in *Adam Bede* to which he refers is this:

Dinah walked as simply as if she were going to market, and seemed as unconscious of her outward appearance as a little boy: there was no blush, no tremulousness, which said, 'I know you think me a pretty woman, too young to preach'; no casting up or down of the eyelids, no compression of the lips, no attitude of the arms, that said, 'But you must think of me as a saint.'

The reference directly contradicts the passage. Mansell goes on to use the idea that Dinah wishes to be regarded as a saint; e.g. 'The saint who held herself above the community has become part of it, a housewife. . . .' (p. 12). He makes this the basis for his comparison of all George Eliot's girl-tragedies, assimilating Dinah's self-sufficiency to Maggie's and Dorothea's subtly self-seeking desires, both to be, and to be thought, saintly, and to Gwendolen's selfishness.

"Mansell quotes a passage from *The Mill on the Floss* about the way 'Nature repairs her ravages' three times in his article without remarking that in the next paragraph George Eliot says, 'But not all.' Since the chief exception is the life of the heroine herself, the ending would seem to be tragic in a different way from the endings of the other stories.

"The passages which Mansell quotes from Hegel could have been given a much subtler application to George Eliot's novels if he had not misread and misquoted in this way. Many novelists before George Eliot had portrayed characters with a mixture of good and evil qualities; it is her originality to show the *very same quality*, in an individual or in the community, as both good and evil. Both of the principles in the conflict are valid. It is worth knowing that she may have derived this moral and artistic sophistication from her reading of Hegel. But the point is lost if the subtlety and variety of her use of these ideas is missed through careless quotation."